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Abstract: When Indigenous peoples go to court to seek justice for the historical wrongs they
have endured, the Crown often tries to prevent their claims from even being heard by pleading
statutes of limitations and laches. The application of these barriers raises serious constitution
issues that have been taken account of by the Supreme Court only in the context of declarations
of constitutional invalidity. Arguments based on the constitutional division of powers and section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 have not been addressed by the Court. As a result, limitations
statutes that vary from province to province have been applied ad hoc by lower courts, with
inconsistent and unjust results. In addition to constitutional concerns, there are also convincing
policy reasons why limitations statutes and laches should not be available to deny Indigenous
claims in most cases. Access to justice has too often been denied to Indigenous peoples in the
past through barriers such as sovereign immunity and federal legislation preventing First Nations
from hiring lawyers to pursue their claims. Reconciliation is not promoted by time limits on legal
action that perpetuate injustice by continuing to deny Indigenous people access to the courts.
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Indigenous claimants face substantial barriers when they seek to have their Aboriginal, treaty,
and other rights validated and enforced by Canadian courts. They have to adapt to a foreign legal
system and jump through the hoops created by the Supreme Court of Canada in order to establish
their rights. Going back to the time of first contact with Europeans or Crown assertion of
sovereignty, to have Aboriginal rights they must prove either practices, customs, or traditions
integral to their distinctive cultures or exclusive occupation of land. 1 Their oral history evidence,
although admissible in court and supposedly entitled to the same kind of respect and weight as
written history, is often denigrated by the Crown and the “experts” it puts on the witness stand. 2
On top of all this, the Crown tries to place procedural barriers in the way of Indigenous
claimants, such as lack of permission to sue the Crown in Calder v Attorney-General of British
Columbia. 3 Prominent among these barriers are statutes of limitations and laches which can
prevent historical claims from even being litigated on their merits. 4
In this paper, we examine and critique the application of time limitations to prevent claims of
Indigenous peoples from being considered by the courts. Relying on Canadian constitutional law,
the sui generis nature of Indigenous rights and the goal of reconciliation, we argue against use of
these limitations to bar Indigenous attempts to achieve justice through litigation that seeks
remedies for historical wrongs. Other issues that arise only if courts decide to apply limitations
statutes, such as discoverability of causes of action, will not be discussed. 5
1. The History and Purposes of Statutory Limitations and Laches
In the old English common law, a freeholder who had been wrongfully dispossessed of land
(disseised, in the terminology of the day) could recover possession (seisin) either by entry (i.e.,
self-help) or action (either a possessory assize of novel disseisin or a proprietary writ of right). 6
In the 13th century, the right of entry was lost if not exercised quickly, possibly after only four
days. 7 By the early 14th century, the right of entry had been extended, but would have been tolled
1

See R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 [Van der Peet]; Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010
[Delgamuukw].
2
See Antonia Mills, “Problems of Establishing Authority in Testifying on Behalf of the Witsuwit’en” (1996) 19:2
Pol & Leg Anthropology Rev 39; Val Napoleon, “Delgamuukw: A Legal Straightjacket for Oral Histories?” (2005)
20 Can JL & Soc 123; Hamar Foster, “One Good Thing: Law, Elevator Etiquette and Litigating Aboriginal Rights in
Canada” (2010) 37 Advocates’ Q 66; Bruce Granville Miller, Oral History on Trial: Recognizing Aboriginal
Narratives in the Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).
3
[1973] SCR 313 [Calder]. This requirement, based on a centuries-old doctrine of Crown immunity from suit, was
subsequently removed by the Crown Proceeding Act, now RSBC 1996, c 89.
4
See Senwung Luk & Brooke Barrett, “Time Is on Our Side: Colonialism Through Laches and Limitations of
Actions in the Age of Reconciliation” in Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 2017: Canada at 150, the
Charter and the Constitution (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2017), 394-422.
5
For recent Supreme Court rulings on discoverability not related to Indigenous claims, see Pioneer Corp. v Godfrey,
2019 SCC 42; Grant Thornton LLP v New Brunswick, 2021 SCC 31. See also Samuel Beswick, “Error of Law: An
Exception to the Discoverability Principle?” (2021) 57:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 295.
6
See AWB Simpson, A History of the Land Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 25-31; Kent McNeil,
Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 17-37 [McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title].
7
See Frederic William Maitland, “The Beatitude of Seisin” (1888) 4 LQR 24 at 29-34 [Maitland, “Beatitude”];
Samuel E Thorne, “Translator’s Introduction” to Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England, 4 vols (Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press, 1968-77), III, xxxiii n14. Donald W Sutherland, The Assize of Novel Disseisin
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 97-118, disputes the four-day rule.
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(terminated) by the death of the wrongdoer while in possession (seised) and the passage of the
land to his or her heir (known as a descent cast). 8 In 1623, an English statute of limitations
limited rights of entry to 20 years. 9 The main purposes of these limitations on rights of entry
were to maintain the peace and protect longstanding possession. Disseised freeholders who did
not exercise their right of entry quickly enough were required to bring a legal action to recover
the land.
The assize of novel disseisin, possibly created during the reign of Henry II (1154-89), also had to
be brought within a reasonably short time, as the name suggests, but the time was extended by
the royal courts as the action became more popular. 10 By the 16th century, the assize of novel
disseisin had been largely replaced by the more convenient action of ejectment. 11 The 1623
limitations statute that barred rights of entry after 20 years also barred the action of ejectment
(which depended on a right of entry) after the same lapse of time, but that Act did not apply to
the writ of right and did not affect title. 12 The time period during which the more cumbersome
writ of right could be brought had been set by statute in 1540 at 30 years for plaintiffs who relied
on their own prior seisin and 60 years for those who relied on the seisin of an ancestor as proof
of their title. 13 In 1833, major reform in England was implemented by the Real Property
Limitation Act,14 which abolished the writ of right and most other real actions and set the time
limit for actions for recovering possession of land at 20 years, at which time the statute abolished
title as well. 15
The time limit to bring actions regarding personal property, contract, and torts was generally set
by the 1623 statute of limitations at six years, with certain exceptions: for assault, battery, and
false imprisonment, the period was four years, and for slander, two years. 16 The Civil Procedure

8

Sir Thomas Littleton, Tenures (circa 1481), English translation in Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of
the Laws of England; or a Commentary upon Littleton, 19th ed (London: J & WT Clarke et al, 1832), s 385;
Maitland, “Beatitude”, supra note 7; Sutherland, supra note 7 at 153-53.
9
21 Jac I, c 16. Note that this statute has been pleaded by defendants in Indigenous rights cases in Canada: see
Stoney Creek Indian Band et al. v Alcan Aluminum Limited, 1999 BCCA 527 (CanLII) at paras 15, 37 [Stoney Creek
CA]; Chippewas of Sarnia Band v Canada (Attorney General), [1999] OJ No 1406 at paras 435, 445 (Chippewas of
Sarnia SCJ); Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 (CanLII) at para 1308 (Tsilhqot’in Nation
BCSC).
10
Sutherland, supra note 7 at 23, 37-38, 130-31.
11
See Arthur George Sedgwick & Frederick Scott Wait, “The History of the Action of Ejectment in England and the
United States” in Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909),
III, 611-45; Simpson, supra note 6 at 144-49.
12
21 Jac I, c 16. See Simpson, supra note 6 at 149-51.
13
32 Hen VIII, c 2.
14
3 & 4 Will IV, c 27. This statute was pleaded by British Columbia in Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 9 at
para 1308.
15
On limitation periods in early English law, see John M Lightwood, The Time Limit on Actions, Being a Treatise
on the Statute of Limitations and Equitable Doctrine of Laches (London: Butterworths, 1909) [Lightwood, Time
Limit].
16
21 Jac I, c 16, s 3. See Lightwood, Time Limit, supra note 15 at 191-93.
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Act, 1833 17 set a 20-year limitation period for actions to obtain payment of certain rents and
debts, and six- and two-year periods for other obscure actions not covered by the 1623 Act. 18
The purposes behind these various limitations on rights of action are well known. At a time when
most people in England were illiterate, proof of land rights depended more on the testimony of
living persons than on written documents. Use of land and the harvesting of crops (taking
esplees) were activities that neighbours could observe as evidence of possession, which was (and
is) a root of title. 19 Until ways to avoid it were found, conveyance of freehold estates had to be
by feoffment with livery of seisin, a ceremony involving the symbolic handing over of a clod of
earth or a branch on the land in the presence of witnesses. 20 As memories faded and people died,
this evidence would be lost, making it more and more difficult to establish the factual basis for
rights. 21 In addition to this practical evidentiary matter, it was thought that, as a general rule,
long, peaceful possession should not be disturbed. Expectations are created by possession,
improvements made, third-party reliance implicated, and so on. Those with land claims should
therefore act on them in a timely way, rather than neglectfully sleep on their rights. 22 Social
harmony as well as conceptions of justice thus militated in favour of barring rights, whether at
common law or by statute, after reasonable periods of time. 23
In our history of limitations up to now, the focus has been on time limitations on enforcement of
common law property rights. With the development of uses (now called trusts), equitable land
rights were created that were not necessarily subject to common law or statutory limitation
periods. Equity developed its own time bar to equitable actions and remedies, known as laches
(from French, “lâche”, meaning slack or negligent). The emphasis in laches is more on the
inaction of the person with the equitable right, in keeping with equity’s focus on the behaviour of
the parties and on fairness, as opposed to strict legal rules. Judges deciding whether to grant
equitable remedies have much more discretion than common law judges, as reflected in the
flexible application of the doctrine of laches, compared with the strict time periods in statutes of
limitations. However, in the exercise of their equitable jurisdiction judges can adopt and apply
statutory limitation periods by analogy if there is a close resemblance between the equitable
action before them and a common law action to which the statute applies. 24 Again, in this

17

3 & 4 Will IV, c 42.
See Lightwood, Time Limit, supra note 15 at 194-97.
19
See John M Lightwood, A Treatise on Possession of Land (London: Stevens & Sons, 1894); McNeil, Common
Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 6 at 6-78.
20
See Simpson, supra note 6 at 119.
21
See Trustees of Dundee Harbour v Dougall (1852) 1 Macq 317 (HL) at 321.
22
See Cholmondeley v Clinton (1820) 2 Jac & W 1 at 140, 37 ER 527 at 577.
23
See Lightwood, Time Limit, supra note 15 at 1-2; Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 5th ed (Toronto:
Carswell, 2010), 138-42 [Ziff, Property Law]; M.(K.) v M.(H.), [1992] 3 SCR 6 at 29-30; Peixeiro v Haberman,
[1997] 3 SCR 549 at para 34; Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, [2002] 4 SCR 245 at para 121 [Wewaykum].
24
See Lightwood, Time Limit, supra note 15 at 251-52; GH Newsom & Lionel Abel-Smith, Preston and Newsom on
Limitation of Actions, 3rd ed (London: The Solicitors’ Law Stationary Society, 1953), 261-62; Jeremy S Williams,
Limitations of Actions in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972), 36-37.
18
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situation judges have discretion, as their authority to apply equitable limitation periods by
analogy arises from the doctrine of laches. 25
The date at which English common law, statutes, and equity were received in Canada varies
from province to province, depending on the manner and time of British colonization and
reception statutes. 26 For example, in Upper Canada (since Confederation, the province of
Ontario), English law in relation to property and civil rights was statutorily received as of
October 15, 1792. 27 This means that the English limitations statute of 1623 would have been
received on that date, whereas the Real Property Limitation Act of 1833 and the Civil Procedure
Act, 1833 would not. Conversely, in British Columbia the latter two Acts, the first of which
superseded the 1623 statute, would have been received because English law was legislatively
introduced as of November 19, 1858. 28 In the three Prairie Provinces, the reception date set by
statute is July 15, 1870, thereby incorporating the 1833 Acts. 29 Of course, the provinces
subsequently enacted their own statutes of limitations, which have often been replaced and
amended.
Because statutes of limitations are generally provincial and vary across Canada, 30 it will not be
possible in this paper to assess and analyze the application of each statute to Indigenous claims.
Instead, our focus will be on how statutes of limitations have been applied to those claims in
selected judicial decisions. Particular attention will be paid to the nature of the claims to which
the statutes have been applied, the impact of the federal division of powers, the constitutional
protections for Aboriginal and treaty rights (especially section 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982 31), and the goal of reconciliation.
2. Leading Canadian Cases
(a) Guerin v The Queen
The cases involving application of statutes of limitations to Indigenous claims reveal a
remarkable and disturbing lack of rigorous analysis on the part of the judges. An early example
is Guerin v The Queen, 32 decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1984. In that case, the
Indian Affairs Branch of the federal government accepted a surrender of reserve lands from the
25

See John Brunyate, Limitation of Actions in Equity (London: Stevens & Sons, 1932), 16, quoted with approval by
La Forest J in M.(K.) v M.(H.), supra note 23 at 74: “the substantial difference between cases where the Court acts in
obedience to a Statute of Limitations and cases where it acts by analogy with the statute is that in the former the
limitation is peremptory whereas in the later it is but part of the law of laches.”
26
See JE Côté, “The Reception of English Law” (1977) 15 Alta L Rev 29; Bruce Ziff, “Warm Reception in a Cold
Climate: English Property Law and the Suppression of Canadian Legal Identity” in J McLaren et al, eds, Despotic
Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 103-19 [Ziff, “Warm
Reception”].
27
Property and Civil Rights Act, 33 Geo III, c 1 (UC), now RSO 1990, c P29. See Côté, supra note 26 at 88-89.
28
Act no 7 of 1867 (BC), now the Law and Equity Act, RSBC 1996, c 253, s 2. See Côté, supra note 26 at 91-92.
29
38 Vict c 12 (Man); 51 Vict 33, s 1 (Can); 49 Vict, c 25, s 3 (Can); 4 & 5 Ed VII, c 3, s 16; 4 & 5 Ed VII, c 42, s
16. See Côté, supra note 26 at 89-91.
30
See Graeme Mew, The Law of Limitations, 3rd ed (Markham ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2016).
31
Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
32
[1984] 2 SCR 335 [Guerin SCC]. For illuminating discussion of the case, see Jim Reynolds, From Wardship to
Rights: The Guerin Case and Aboriginal Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2020).
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Musqueam Band in the 1950s and leased them to a golf club on terms substantially less
beneficial to the Musqueam than those they had agreed to. The Federal Court trial judge found
that the surrender had created a trust and that the Crown breached the trust when it leased the
lands on terms other than those agreed to by the Musqueam. 33 He awarded ten million dollars in
equitable damages to the Musqueam, and this decision was upheld by the Supreme Court. Justice
Wilson, for herself and two other members of the Court, agreed that a trust had been created,
whereas Justice Dickson, for himself and three others, found that a trust had not been created. He
upheld the damage award nonetheless on the basis of breach of the Crown’s fiduciary
obligations.
The Crown had argued that the British Columbia statute of limitations 34 barred the action
because more than six years (the limitation period) had passed between the time of the lease and
the commencement of the action. The trial judge found, and the Supreme Court agreed, 35 that the
limitation period had not run out because it did not start to run until the Musqueam obtained a
copy of the lease. Prior to that, Crown officials had refused to give the Musqueam a copy and
were guilty of equitable fraud, which prevented time from running. 36 The Supreme Court also
agreed with the trial judge that the Crown’s unconscionable conduct and the Musqueam’s lack of
knowledge of the contents of the lease prevented the Crown from relying on the equitable
doctrine of laches. 37
Although the trial judge and the Supreme Court rightly concluded that the Musqueam claim was
not barred by the statute of limitations, the problem with this aspect of their judgments is that
they provided no explanation of why a provincial statute could even apply to an allegation in
Federal Court of a breach of fiduciary obligation by the Crown in right of Canada. While it is
true that a provision of the Federal Court Act 38 referentially incorporates into federal law
limitation periods in the province where a cause of action arises, it is odd that none of the judges
in the Guerin case mentioned or explicitly relied on this provision. Moreover, they seemed to
take for granted that statutes of limitation apply to Indigenous claims, despite the sui generis
nature of Indigenous peoples’ Aboriginal, treaty, and other rights and their special relationship
with the Crown, as acknowledged in Guerin and numerous other cases. 39 Also, the history of
33

[1982] 2 FC 385 [Guerin FC].
RSBC 1960, c 370; RSBC 1979, c 236.
35
Guerin SCC, supra note 32 at 389-90. The Federal Court Appeal did not deal with the application of the statute or
with laches because it was of the opinion that the Crown did not owe equitable obligations in the circumstances:
[1983] 2 FC 656 at paras 117-18.
36
Guerin FC, supra note 33 at 129-61; Guerin SCC, supra note 32 at 389-90.
37
Guerin FC, supra note 33 at 62-69; Guerin SCC, supra note 32 at 390.
38
SC 1970-71-72, c 1 (reproduced in RSC 1970 (2nd Supp), c 10), s 38(1), now the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985,
c F-7, s 39(1), which provides: “Except as expressly provided by any other Act, the laws relating to prescription and
the limitation of actions in force in a province between subject and subject apply to any proceedings in the Federal
Court of Appeal or the Federal Court in respect of any cause of action arising in that province.” Note also s 39(2),
which would apply in the territories: “A proceeding in the Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court in respect of
a cause of action arising otherwise than in a province shall be taken within six years after the cause of action arose.”
Prior to the Federal Court Act, in force as of June 1, 1971, the Exchequer Court Act contained an equivalent
provision: RSC 1927, c 34, s 32; RSC 1952, c 98, s 31.
39
Guerin SCC, supra note 32 at 382, 385, 387. See also Simon v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at para 33 [Simon];
Delgamuukw, supra note 1, esp paras 3, 82, 112; R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456 at paras 44 (Binnie J), 78
34
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colonial repression would have made it very difficult, if not impossible, for Indigenous people to
be aware of and be able to bring their claims in Canadian courts. 40 How were they to know or
understand the procedural details of a foreign legal system expressed in languages (English and
French) that most of them would have had little or no knowledge of until forced to learn them in
residential schools? Moreover, when some First Nations in British Columbia did contemplate
litigating their claims, a 1927 amendment to the Indian Act, 41 in place until 1951, made it
virtually impossible for them to do so because it made it illegal for anyone to raise money or pay
legal counsel to pursue any “Indian” claim without the written permission of the Superintendent
General of Indian Affairs.
The problem with this aspect of the Guerin case is that it created a precedent for the application
of limitation periods to Indigenous claims. 42 Perhaps the Supreme Court judges thought that,
because they could avoid the application of the statute on the facts, they did not need to engage
in an analysis of why it should apply as a matter of law. But surely the question of whether it was
appropriate to apply the statute at all should have been considered and analyzed first. 43
(b) Blueberry River Indian Band v Canada
Blueberry River Indian Band v Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development) 44 also involved a claim against the Crown in right of Canada for breach of its
fiduciary obligations in the context of a surrender of reserve land. The Supreme Court decided
that the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) had breached the Crown’s fiduciary obligations to
the First Nations in question by not reserving the mineral rights for them when it transferred the
surrendered lands to the Director of The Veterans’ Land Act, 1942 45 (DVLA), making the lands
available for grant to veterans who had returned from World War II. The claim for that breach
was barred by the British Columbia statute of limitations that placed a 30-year maximum
limitation period on all claims. 46 However, the Court held that the DIA, when it discovered that
the mineral rights had been transferred to the DVLA in error, breached the Crown’s fiduciary
(McLachlin J, dissenting on another issue) [Marshall]; John Borrows & Leonard I Rotman, “The Sui Generis
Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does It Make a Difference?” (1997) 36:1 Alta L Rev 9; James [Sákéj] Youngblood
Henderson, “Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties” (1997) 36:1 Alta L Rev 46.
40
See James I Reynolds, A Breach of Duty: Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing, 2005), 197-99; Luk & Barrett, supra note 4.
41
An Act to Amend the Indian Act, SC 1926-27, c 32, s 6, which became s 141 of the Indian Act, RSC 1927, c 98.
See Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990), 99-113; Chief Stanley Thomas v R, 1998 CanLII 6557 (BCSC) at paras 61-62 [Chief
Stanley Thomas BCSC], overturned on appeal on the grounds that summary judgment was not appropriate because
an adequate factual basis was lacking and important constitutional issues were involved: Stoney Creek CA, supra
note 9 at para 38.
42
E.g. see Kruger v The Queen, 1985 CanLII 3052 (FCA), [1986] 1 FC 3 (the court relied on Guerin and section 38
of the Federal Court Act, supra note 38, to hold that claims for wrongful federal taking of reserve lands, even if
proven (which the majority decided they were not), were barred by provincial limitation periods); Lower Kootenay
Indian Band v Canada, [1991] FCJ No 529 (where claims against the Crown for breaches of fiduciary duty and
negligence were barred by limitation periods).
43
See Luk & Barrett, supra note 4 at 402.
44
[1995] 4 SCR 34 [Blueberry River].
45
SC 1942, c 33.
46
Limitation Act, RSBC 1979, c 236 (previously SBC 1975, c 37), s 8.
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obligations again by not cancelling the transfer, as it had the authority to do under a provision of
the Indian Act that was in force at the time. 47 It retained this authority up to the time the lands
were granted to veterans, which for about 22% of the lands had happened within the 30-year
period. 48 Moreover, even if the shorter six-year period in the statute of limitations applied, 49 this
was a situation where “material facts relating to the cause of action have been wilfully
concealed”, in which case time does not start to run until a “reasonable man,” with knowledge of
those facts and appropriate advice, would have known he had a cause of action that would have
“a reasonable prospect of success.” 50 Justice McLachlin, with whom the other members of the
Court agreed on this point, said that “[t]his section [of the statute] and its equivalents elsewhere
embrace a broad definition of discoverability…. The facts in the case at bar fall within it.” 51 The
First Nations were therefore awarded damages for breach of the Crown’s fiduciary obligations
regarding the mineral rights transferred to veterans after the DIA became aware of its error in
transferring those rights to the DVLA.
Unlike in Guerin, the Supreme Court relied explicitly on section 38(1) (now section 39(1)) of the
Federal Court Act, 52 which “adopts the limitations legislation in place in the province where the
cause of action arose,” 53 to explain how the BC statute of limitations could apply in the Federal
Court where the Blueberry River litigation had been brought. In so doing, Justice McLachlin
summarily dismissed concerns over applying limitations statutes to Indigenous claims: “Other
arguments, neither presented nor considered below, were presented by the Bands and interveners
in support of relaxing or not applying the limitation periods prescribed by the Limitation Act of
British Columbia. I find them unpersuasive in the context of this case and consider them no
further.” 54 As Blueberry River, like Guerin, involved the Crown’s fiduciary obligations in the

47

RSC 1927, c 98, s 64.
Blueberry River, supra note 44 at paras 118-19.
49
Limitation Act, supra note 46, s 3(4).
50
Ibid, s 6(3)(e).
51
Blueberry River, supra note 44 at para 121, citing M.(K.) v. M.(H.), supra note 23. See also per Gonthier J at paras
1, 20-23.
52
Supra note 38. Section 39(1) was also applied in Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v Canada, 2006 FCA 415
(CanLII), [2007] 3 FCR 245, at paras 323-24, affirmed [2009] 1 SCR 222, without reference to limitations issues.
53
Blueberry River, supra note 44 at para 107.
54
Ibid at para 122. In Blueberry River, one of the interveners made these arguments, as quoted by Justice Russell in
Samson First Nation v Canada, 2015 FC 836 (CanLII) at para 132 [Samson First Nation]:
a. s. 39 of the Federal Courts Act is unconstitutional as it extinguishes constitutionally protected
aboriginal and treaty rights and does not express a clear and plain intention to do so;
b. s. 39 is inconsistent with the fiduciary duties of the Crown towards aboriginal people;
c. a claim based on an aboriginal interest in land is not subject to a limitation period because the
cause of action has not yet been finally extinguished, given an aboriginal interest in land is a sui
generis collective right that accrues to members individually as they are born;
d. any limitation period should be postponed pursuant to discoverability provisions which
postpone limitation periods until the claimant ought to have known they had a reasonable cause of
action, on the basis that prior to the enactment of the Constitution in 1982 and the Supreme
Court decisions in Guerin and Sparrow, the law surrounding First Nations was poorly understood and
aboriginal people have been educationally disadvantaged and in a relationship of unquestioning
dependence with the Crown;
48
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context of surrender of reserve lands, this left open the possibly that arguments against the
application of statutes of limitation might be accepted in other Indigenous claims contexts.
(c) Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada
The next significant case in which the application of limitation periods was considered, again in
the context of the Crown’s fiduciary obligations to First Nations, was Wewaykum Indian Band v
Canada. 55 This case involved reserve creation rather than surrender of reserve lands. Two Indian
bands on Vancouver Island each claimed that the Crown had improperly set aside land to which
it was entitled as a reserve for the other band. The Supreme Court decided that, while fiduciary
duties may be owed in the context of reserve creation, there had been no breach of the Crown’s
fiduciary obligations to the bands in this instance. Moreover, even if breaches had occurred, the
legal actions were barred by the passage of time.
The relevant statutes were the BC Statute of Limitations, 56 which had been in force from 1897 to
1975, and BC Limitations Act 57 of 1975 that replaced it, both of which were referentially
incorporated into federal law by section 39(1) of the Federal Court Act. 58 Justice Binnie,
delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court, considered several arguments why the
limitations statutes should not apply. First, it was argued that a provincial statute could not
extinguish an Indian interest, as this is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament. 59 While
acknowledging that “the B.C. Limitations Act provides for extinguishment of the cause of
action,” Binnie J said, “it applies as federal law. Parliament is entitled to adopt, in the exercise of
its exclusive legislative power, the legislation of another jurisdictional body, as it may from time
to time exist…. This is precisely what Parliament did when it enacted what is now s. 39(1) of the
e. s. 39 cannot apply to an Indian Band’s sui generis causes of action for breaches of the Crown’s
trust or fiduciary obligation because s. 39 only applies to the limitation periods in force in any
province between subject and subject; and
f. Given the relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples is a unique trust or fiduciary one,
no limitation periods should ever apply against aboriginal beneficiaries and the Court should adopt the
historical rule applied in the Courts of Equity that no limitation periods apply to a trust beneficiary
while the trust remains in effect.
From this, Russell J concluded that the Supreme Court had considered and rejected arguments that application of
limitations statutes to Indigenous claims is unconstitutional. He added that “[t]here is no indication in Blueberry
River that the Plaintiffs’ (in that case as Interveners) constitutional arguments were only rejected because no Notice
of Constitutional Question was filed” (para 134). This discussion was affirmed on appeal: Buffalo v Canada, 2016
FCA 223 (CanLII), leave to appeal dismissed, 2017 CanLII 12235 (SCC). It is nonetheless remarkable, and in our
opinion unacceptable, that the Supreme Court should dismiss such important constitutional issues without even
addressing them.
55
Wewaykum, supra note 23. See Leonard I Rotman, “Wewaykum: A New Spin on the Crown’s Fiduciary
Obligations to Aboriginal Peoples?” (2004) 37:1 UBC L Rev 219 at 240-44; Luk & Barrett, supra note 4 at 403-04.
56
RSBC 1897, c 123.
57
SBC 1975, c 37.
58
Supra note 38. See Wewaykum, supra note 23 at paras 125-32. See also Tacan v Canada, 2005 FC 385 [Tacan],
applying Wewaykum and section 39(1) to claims by First Nation veterans based on breach of fiduciary obligations
and fraudulent misrepresentation by the Crown.
59
Wewaykum, supra note 23 at para 115. The relevant provision is section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, 30
& 31 Vict, c 3 (UK). Binnie J appears to have accepted the argument, as he cited Canadian Pacific Ltd. v Paul,
[1988] 2 SCR 654 at 673 [Canadian Pacific] as authority. For confirmation, see Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at paras
172-83.
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Federal Court Act.” 60 As the extinguishment occurred before April 17, 1982, when section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982 came into force, Binnie J did not have to consider the impact of that
constitutional provision (discussed below).
The second argument was that sections 13 and 14 of the Federal Real Property Act 61 prevented
the BC statutes of limitations from applying because those sections prohibit the acquisition of
federal real property, which would include reserve land, by provincial legislation or prescription.
Justice Binnie gave two reasons for dismissing this contention. First, any acquisition of the
reserve land would be by virtue of federal legislation, namely section 39(1) of the Federal Court
Act, not provincial legislation. Secondly, the land in question remained federal real property, as
defined in the Federal Real Property Act, 62 because reserve land in British Columbia is vested in
the Crown in right of Canada and the underlying title was not in dispute in this case. 63
The third argument was that section 39(1) of the Federal Court Act cannot apply to referentially
incorporate provincial limitation periods because under the Indian Act the only way an Indian
band can be divested of its reserve land is by a valid surrender. 64 It was contended that the
qualifying words, “Except as expressly provided by any other Act,” in section 39(1) would
include this aspect of the Indian Act. Binnie J’s response was that those words refer “to another
limitation or prescription period. The Indian Act does not establish any comprehensive scheme
for the litigation and adjudication of disputes regarding reserves. The adjudication of such
disputes is within the jurisdiction of the courts and in this case is governed by the Act
constituting the Federal Court. There is thus no relevant statutory provision to the contrary.” 65
For present purposes, the fourth and final argument, that limitation periods “should not be
allowed to operate as ‘instruments of injustice’,” 66 is the most significant. In response, Justice
Binnie fell back on standard justifications for limitations of actions: “Witnesses are no longer
available, historical documents are lost and difficult to contextualize, and expectations of fair
practices change.” 67 This observation came from the same Supreme Court that had decided just
six years earlier in Van der Peet 68 that Aboriginal rights depend on proof of practices, customs,
and traditions integral to distinctive Indigenous cultures at the time of first contact with
Europeans, which can be as much as 400 years in the past. 69 A year later, the Court decided in
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Wewaykum, supra note 23 at paras 115-16. As authority, Binnie J cited Coughlin v Ontario Highway Transport
Board, [1968] SCR 569; Attorney General for Ontario v Scott, [1956] SCR 137. See also Peepeekisis First Nation v
Canada, 2013 FCA 191 (CanLII) at para 30 [Peepeekisis First Nation FCA]; Canada v Jim Shot Both Sides, 2022
FCA 20 at para 42 [Jim Shot Both Sides].
61
SC 1991, c 50.
62
Ibid, s 2.
63
Wewaykum, supra note 23 at paras 117-18, applied in Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation v Canada (Attorney General),
2016 SKCA 124 (CanLII) at para 217 [Peter Ballantyne CA], leave to appeal dismissed 2017 CanLII 38581 (SCC).
64
See also Peter Ballantyne CA, supra note 63 at paras 218-30, where this argument was addressed and dismissed.
65
Wewaykum, supra note 23 at para 120 (Binnie J’s emphasis).
66
Ibid at para 121.
67
Ibid.
68
Supra note 1.
69
See R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101. Compare this with proof of customary rights in England, which must in theory
have originated before 1189, but can in fact be proven by testimony of living witnesses that the custom has been
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Delgamuukw 70 that Aboriginal title depends on proof of exclusive Indigenous occupation of land
at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, which occurred in 1713 in parts of the Maritime
Provinces, 1763 in southern Quebec and Ontario, and 1846 in British Columbia. 71 Living
witnesses in Aboriginal rights and title cases? They do not exist. Historical documents?
Indigenous peoples generally did not keep them. Expectations of fair practices? At the time of
contact and assertion of Crown sovereignty before treaties were even negotiated, would there
have been shared expectations?
Justice Binnie nonetheless emphasized the “need for repose”, pointing to the facts of the case:
… the bands had independent legal advice at least by the 1930s, and were aware at
that time of the material facts, if not all the details, on which the present claims are
based. While the feeling may not have been unanimous, each band membership
elected not to disturb its neighbours. The conduct of each band between 1907 and
1936 suggests that not only was the other band’s open and notorious occupation of its
reserve acknowledged, but such occupation was considered, as between the bands, to
be fair and equitable. 72
While acknowledging that “[t]his is not to say that historical grievances should be ignored, or
that injustice necessarily loses its sting with the passage of the years”, 73 on the facts Justice
Binnie did not think any injustice had been done in this instance: “Awareness of the availability
of a claim in equity for financial compensation against the Crown [as a result of the Guerin
decision] does not … turn what the band regarded as an equitable situation into an inequitable
situation.” 74
Having determined that the BC statutes of limitations applied, Justice Binnie found that time had
run out long before the litigation had been commenced. In so doing, he dismissed a contention
that exclusion of the appellant bands from the reserve land they claimed was a “continuing
breach”, giving rise to a new cause of action every day it continued:
Acceptance of such a position would, of course, defeat the legislative purpose of
limitation periods. For a fiduciary, in particular, there would be no repose. In my
view such a conclusion is not compatible with the intent of the legislation…. It was
open to both bands to commence action no later than 1943 when the Department of
Indian Affairs finally amended the relevant Schedule of Reserves. There was no

practised for as long as they can remember: see Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. reissue (Butterworths: London,
1998), vol 12(1), paras 607, 627.
70
Supra note 1.
71
Compare the requirements for proof of title to land by adverse possession, which, depending on the local statute,
can be as short as ten years: e.g. see the Real Property Limitations Act, RSO 1990, c L15, ss 4 and 15.
72
Wewaykum, supra note 23 at paras 122-23.
73
Ibid at para 123.
74
Ibid at para 124.
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repetition of an allegedly injurious act after that date. The damage (if any) had been
done. 75
Justice Binnie decided as well that any claims the appellant bands might have for breach of the
Crown’s fiduciary obligations were also barred by the equitable doctrine of laches and
acquiescence. 76 Their conduct in accepting the status quo regarding the reserve lands for several
decades amounted to a waiver of any rights they may have had to claim compensation for loss of
those lands. Additionally, each band had made improvements on the reserve land it occupied, on
the reasonable understanding that the other band would make no claim to the land. “All of this,”
Binnie J said, “was done with sufficient knowledge ‘of the underlying facts relevant to a possible
legal claim’.” 77
(d) Canada (Attorney General) v Lameman
The next Supreme Court decision to consider is Canada (Attorney General) v Lameman. 78 The
case was brought in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench by individuals who claimed to be
descendants of Papaschase Band members who had adhered to Treaty 6 in 1877. 79 Some of the
band members “took scrip” in 1886, 80 and the reserve lands that had been set aside for the band
were surrendered to the Crown in 1889. The members remaining in the band at that time joined
the Enoch Band, but continued to be entitled to the money from the sale of the reserve lands that
the Crown held in trust. The claimants alleged that the Crown had breached its treaty obligations
by not providing all the reserve land the band was entitled to and by not providing farm
implements and food during periods of famine. They also alleged that the consequences of taking
scrip had not been explained and that the Indian Act requirements for surrender of reserve lands
had not been followed. Breach of fiduciary duty for mismanaging the proceeds of sale of the
reserve lands was also alleged.
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Ibid at para 135. Justice Binnie does not appear to have been aware that, in 1943, First Nations were prohibited
from raising money or hiring lawyers to pursue their claims without federal government permission: see note 41
supra.
76
See also Callihoo v Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2006 ABQB 1 (CanLII) at
paras 157-60 [Callihoo], where Hillier J, in obiter, likewise would have applied laches and acquiescence to dismiss
the claims. The Alberta CA reversed because the decision had been based in part on a flawed affidavit: 2007 ABCA
59.
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Ibid at para 111, quoting from M.(K.) v M.(H.), supra note 23 at 79.
78
[2008] 1 SCR 372 (Lameman). See also Goodswimmer v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ABCA 365 at paras
112-27, leave to appeal dismissed 2018 CanLII 61050 (SCC), applying Lameman. See Luk & Barrett, supra note 4
at 404-05.
79
Proceedings against the Crown in right of Canada can generally be brought in either the Federal Court or in a
provincial superior court. The Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c C-50, s 21(1), provides: “In all
cases where a claim is made against the Crown, except where the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction with
respect to it, the superior court of the province in which the claim arises has concurrent jurisdiction with respect to
the subject-matter of the claim.”
80
Scrip, a certificate that could be exchanged for a set amount of land or money, was distributed by the Crown to
settle the land claims of some of the Métis: see Donald Purich, The Metis (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1988), 107-27;
Manitoba Metis Federation v Canada (Attorney General), [2013] 1 SCR 623 [Manitoba Metis Federation SCC] at
paras 118-23. Apparently, the band members who took scrip gave up their Indian status and treaty rights.
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The Crown brought a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the allegations did not
disclose triable issues, that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and that the Alberta Limitations of
Action Act 81 and laches barred the action. On appeal from the motions judge and the Alberta
Court of Appeal, 82 the Supreme Court dealt only with the statute of limitations defence, which
the Court unanimously held barred each of the claims, with the exception of the claim for an
accounting of the proceeds of sale of the reserve lands, which the Court said is a continuing
claim not caught by the statute. 83 On the facts available, the other claims were known to the
plaintiffs or discoverable by them by the exercise of reasonable diligence by the 1970s at the
latest and so were barred by the six-year limitation period.
The Court relied upon the Wewaykum decision as authority that “the rules on limitation periods
apply to Aboriginal claims.” 84 However, we have seen that the BC statute of limitations applied
in that case because the action had been brought in the Federal Court and what is now section
39(1) of the Federal Court Act referentially incorporated the statute into federal law. The action
in Lameman had been brought, not in the Federal Court, but in the Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench. For this reason, the explanation for the application of the provincial statute in
Wewaykum should not have applied in Lameman. 85 However, as pointed out by the motions
judge in Lameman, an equivalent provision in the federal Crown Liability and Proceedings
Act, 86 versions of which have been in force since 1886, 87 allows the Crown in right of Canada to
rely on the relevant provincial statute of limitations in any proceedings against it:
32. Except as otherwise provided in this Act or in any other Act of Parliament, the
laws relating to prescription and the limitation of actions in force in a province
between subject and subject apply to any proceedings by or against the Crown in
respect of any cause of action arising in that province, and proceedings by or against
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RSA 1980, c L-15, s 4.
The Alberta CA would have reversed the motions judge’s decision that the action was barred by the limitations
statute and have allowed the case to proceed to trial: Lameman v Canada (Attorney General), 2006 ABCA 392.
83
Lameman, supra note 78 at para 12. See also the motion judge’s decision, Papaschase Indian Band (Descendants
of) v Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 8 WWR 442 at paras 127, 225 [Papaschase Indian Band].
84
Lameman, supra note 78 at para 13. See McCallum v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SKQB 42 (CanLII) at
para 38 [McCallum], where this unqualified statement was applied to an action by Métis persons who alleged that
the Crown had breached fiduciary and other obligations owed to them when it created the Cold Lake Weapons
Range on lands they traditionally used for hunting, trapping and fishing. See also Athabasca Chipewyan First
Nation v Alberta (Minister of Energy), 2011 ABCA 29 (CanLII) [Athabasca Chipewyan], where the Court applied
Lameman to bar judicial review of an administrative decision allegedly made without consultation.
85
See Canadian Pacific, supra note 59 at 673; Chippewas of Sarnia SCJ, supra note 9 at paras 496-500. In Chief
Stanley Thomas BCSC, supra note 41, Lysyk J distinguished between cases brought in the Federal Court, where
section 39(1) applies, and cases brought in a provincial court, where it does not and where provincial limitations
statutes cannot apply of their own force if they trench upon federal jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved
for the Indians.” That case involved an action for trespass to reserve lands against the Crown in right of British
Columbia and a private corporation. Lysyk J’s judgment was overturned on appeal without addressing the
constitutional issues: Stoney Creek CA, supra note 9.
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Supra note 79, s 32.
87
See Papaschase Indian Band, supra note 83 at para 134, referring to Petitions of Right Act, RSC 1886, c 136, s 8,
and the Crown Liability Act, SC 1952-53, c 30, s 19.
82
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the Crown in respect of a cause of action arising otherwise than in a province shall be
taken within six years after the cause of action arose.
So although the Supreme Court was not wrong to conclude that provincial limitation periods can
apply in actions against the Crown in right of Canada, it should have relied upon this statutory
provision rather than Wewaykum. This is just one indication that the Court in Lameman was not
prepared to give serious consideration to arguments that statutes of limitations may not apply to
Indigenous claims in some circumstances.
Another problem is that the Court did not specify the precise date when the plaintiffs, exercising
due diligence, should have been aware of the facts giving rise to the claims. It could have been
in 1974 or 1979. 88 If 1979, the six-year limitation period would not have run out in 1982 when
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 came into force. 89 In R v Van der Peet and Mitchell v
MNR, 90 both decided before Lameman, the Supreme Court held that section prevented even
Parliament from extinguishing Aboriginal rights unilaterally. This conclusion must apply to
treaty rights as well because they were given the same constitutional protection by section 35.
Not all of the plaintiffs’ claims in Lameman would have been to section 35 rights, but the claim
for breach of treaty rights clearly would have been. So even though the Crown Liability and
Proceedings Act would have incorporated the Alberta statute of limitations into federal law, the
statute could not have applied to extinguish treaty rights that were still in existence when section
35 came into force. 91 If the barring of the right of action by the Alberta legislation after that were
held to be only an infringement rather than an extinguishment of rights, 92 the Crown still would
have had to justify the infringement under the Sparrow test by proving a valid legislative
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Lameman, supra note 78 at para 17.
Remarkably, the Court observed: “We note that no notice of a constitutional question was given, and that no
constitutional challenges lie before the Court”: ibid at para 9. Why not? Counsel may not have raised the
constitutional issue if they thought time began to run earlier than 1976, but shouldn’t the Court have taken note of
the issue in deciding that time may only have begun to run in 1979? In Samson First Nation, supra note 54 at para
135, Russell J noted that “in Lameman SCC, above, the Supreme Court of Canada applied the applicable provisions
of the Alberta limitations statute in force at the time. There was no discussion of the fact that limitations legislation
could not apply to constitutionally-protected treaty or Aboriginal rights. I cannot accept that the Supreme Court of
Canada would have applied legislation that was constitutionally inapplicable because it lacked a Notice of
Constitutional Question.” However, in Samson First Nation the plaintiffs were challenging the constitutionality of
the application of limitations statutes, and Russell J’s decision was affirmed on appeal: see supra note 54. See also
LeCaine v Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs, 2015 SKCA 43 (CanLII) at para 60, where Jackson J decided
that “limitation periods apply equally to constitutionally-protected aboriginal rights claims (see Lameman at para
12).” However, she also stated at para 59 that, “[a]s a general rule, appellate courts do not hear constitutional
arguments for the first time on appeal (see Wuttunee v Merck Frosst Canada Ltd., 2008 SKCA 125 at para 13, 314
Sask R 90). Further, no notice was given to the Attorney General or the other respondents. In such circumstances,
the Court declines to consider this issue” (para 59). The issue was the constitutionality of section 14.2(1) of the
Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5, setting a three-year limit to protest “the inclusion or addition of the name of a person
in, or the omission or deletion of the name of a person from, the Indian Register, or a Band List.”
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Van der Peet, supra note 1 at para 28; Mitchell v MNR, [2001] 1 SCR 911 at para 11 [Mitchell].
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In R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 [Sparrow] at 1091-93, the Court held that any Aboriginal or treaty rights not
previously extinguished would have been existing rights recognized and affirmed by section 35(1).
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Land rights apart (see Limitations of Action Act, supra note 81, s 44), the statute barred actions without explicitly
barring rights.
89

15

objective, minimal impairment, consultation, and payment of compensation. 93 Importantly,
however, the Court noted “that no notice of a constitutional question was given, and that no
constitutional challenges lie before the Court.” 94 As constitutional issues were not raised,
Lameman cannot be authority for excluding consideration of constitutional questions when
statutes of limitations are pleaded as defences to Indigenous claims. 95
(e) Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v Canada
The Supreme Court considered the application of statutes of limitations to Indigenous claims
again in Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v Canada (Attorney General). 96 This case involved a
claim by the Métis of Manitoba that the Crown in right of Canada had breached its fiduciary
obligations and not acted in accordance with the honour of the Crown in implementing the
provisions in the Manitoba Act, 1870 that relate to their land rights. The plaintiffs also alleged
that certain provincial statutes relating to those provisions were ultra vires. 97 As they were not
requesting any remedies other than declarations, the Court had to decide whether limitations
statutes and laches apply to actions for declarations that the Crown has not acted honourably.
In these contexts, the majority, in a judgment written by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice
Karakatsanis, decided that statutes of limitations and the doctrine of laches do not apply. 98 The
claim in this case was not for personal remedies that would be barred by limitation periods, but
for declarations of constitutional invalidity not barred by the passage of time: “this Court has
found that limitations of actions statutes cannot prevent the courts, as guardians of the
Constitution, from issuing declarations on the constitutionality of legislation. By extension,
limitations acts cannot prevent the courts from issuing a declaration on the constitutionality of
the Crown’s conduct.” 99 However, if the plaintiffs had been seeking personal remedies such as
93

Sparrow, supra note 91 at 1111-19. Compare Samson First Nation, supra note 54 at para 120, where Russell J
stated: “In my view, Lameman SCC leaves no doubt that the Supreme Court of Canada felt there was no issue of
constitutionality when it comes to applying limitations legislation to claims involving Aboriginal and treaty rights.”
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rights? The answer given by Russell J (see paras 129-30, 213-30, 240) and by Smith J in Peter Ballantyne Cree
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Supreme Court of Canada Rules. Serving and filing a NCQ puts all federal and provincial attorneys general on
notice that the appellant is challenging the constitutional validity or applicability of some piece of legislation. The
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constitutionality when it comes to applying limitations legislation to claims involving Aboriginal and treaty rights”
(see note 89 above).
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Supra note 80. See Luk & Barrett, supra note 4 at 405-08.
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The Court decided this claim was moot and did not need to be addressed, as the challenged statutes are no longer
in force and could not have any future impact: Manitoba Metis Federation SCC, supra note 80 at paras 129-32.
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Rothstein and Moldaver JJ dissented on these and other issues: ibid at paras 215-303.
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damages, even if flowing from the unconstitutionality of a statute, apparently limitation periods
would have applied. 100
Where Indigenous peoples are concerned, the need for reconciliation is another reason the
majority gave why courts cannot be barred for ruling on the constitutionally of Crown actions,
even if they occurred a long time in the past:
The unfinished business of reconciliation of the Métis people with Canadian
sovereignty is a matter of national and constitutional import. The courts are the
guardians of the Constitution and … cannot be barred by mere statutes from issuing a
declaration on a fundamental constitutional matter. The principles of legality,
constitutionality and the rule of law demand no less. 101
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Karakatsanis then explained that reconciliation is a
fundamental goal that has to be taken into account in determining the application of statutes of
limitations:
Contemporary limitations statutes seek to balance protection of the defendant with
fairness to the plaintiffs…. In the Aboriginal context, reconciliation must weigh
heavily in the balance. As noted by Harley Schachter:
The various rationales for limitations are still clearly relevant, but it is the writer’s
view that the goal of reconciliation is a far more important consideration and
ought to be given more weight in the analysis. Arguments that provincial
limitations apply of their own force, or can be incorporated as valid federal law,
miss the point when aboriginal and treaty rights are at issue. They ignore the real
analysis that ought to be undertaken, which is one of reconciliation and
justification.
Schachter was writing in the context of Aboriginal rights, but the argument applies
with equal force here…. The point is that despite the legitimate policy rationales in

deciding that Manitoba Metis Federation does not apply to permit a declaration of breach of honour of the Crown in
relation to reserve lands where an effective alternative recourse is available, namely a claim under the Specific
Claims Tribunal Act, SC 2008, c 22.
100
Manitoba Metis Federation SCC, supra note 80 at para 134, citing Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v New Brunswick
(Finance), [2007] 1 SCR 3 [Kingstreet Investments SCC] (see paras 59-61) and Ravndahl v Saskatchewan [2009] 1
SCR 181 [Ravndahl SCC]. In Ravndahl, the Court distinguished between in personam remedies (e.g. damages),
which can be barred by limitation periods, and in rem remedies (e.g. declarations of constitutional invalidity) that
cannot. See further discussion at notes 234-41 below. However, neither of these cases involved claims by
Indigenous people. They involved Charter remedies under section 24(1) that are available only for violations of
Charter rights. Because Indigenous rights, including section 35 rights, are not Charter rights, section 24(1) does not
apply to them: see R v Desautel, 2017 BCSC 2389 at paras 24, 124, affirmed 2019 BCCA 151 at para 27, affirmed R
v Desautel, 2021 SCC 17 [Desautel SCC], without reference to section 24(1); Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies
in Canada, 2nd ed (looseleaf) (Toronto: Canada law Book, 2013), §15.100 n8, §15.1720. It is therefore not obvious
why case law involving section 24(1) should apply to Indigenous rights that are sui generis and differ greatly from
Charter rights.
101
Manitoba Metis Federation SCC, supra note 80 at para 140. The Court referred to Reference re Secession of
Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 72.
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favour of statutory limitations periods, in the Aboriginal context, there are unique
rationales that must sometimes prevail. 102
McLachlin CJ and Karakatsanis J also found the doctrine of laches to be inapplicable in the
circumstances. 103 The two main considerations, they said, are whether the claimant acquiesced
and whether the defendant’s position changed as a consequence of “reasonable reliance on the
claimant’s acceptance of the status quo.” 104 Taking the circumstances into account, they
concluded: “In the context of this case – including the historical injustices suffered by the Métis,
the imbalance in power that followed Crown sovereignty, and the negative consequences
following delays in allocating the land grants – delay by itself cannot be interpreted as some
clear act by the claimants which amounts to acquiescence or waiver.” 105 Moreover,
… in this rapidly evolving area of the law, it is rather unrealistic to suggest that the
Métis sat on their rights before the courts were prepared to recognize those rights. As
it is, the Métis commenced this claim before s. 35 was entrenched in the
Constitution, and long before the honour of the Crown was elucidated in Haida
Nation. It is difficult to see how this could constitute acquiescence in equity. 106
These reasons for not invoking laches could also apply to statutes of limitations. Given that the
Supreme Court did not acknowledge that the Crown can owe fiduciary duties to Indigenous
peoples before the Guerin decision in 1984, and decided for the first time in Haida Nation v
British Columbia 107 in 2004 that the Crown has been constitutionally bound by the honour of the
Crown since asserting sovereignty, 108 how could statutes of limitations have applied to those
kinds of claims before the viability of the claims was acknowledged by the Supreme Court?
Discoverability should apply not just to the facts underlying a claim, but also to the availability
of judicial remedies. 109
Nor had the delay in the Métis case caused the Crown to alter its position in any way.
Additionally, courts must consider the conscionability of the parties’ behavior in exercising their
equitable jurisdiction. In this case the Crown did not act honourably and so could not rely on
102

Manitoba Metis Federation SCC, supra note 80 at para 141, quoting Harley Schachter, “Selected Current Issues
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laches. 110 McLachlin CJ and Karakatsanis J also observed that “[i]t is difficult to see how a
court, in its role as guardian of the Constitution, could apply an equitable doctrine to defeat a
claim for a declaration that a provision of the Constitution has not been fulfilled as required by
the honour of the Crown.” 111
The Court therefore issued a declaration that the constitutional obligation of the Crown to act
honourably in its dealings with the Métis had been breached. However, as the Court had
concluded that the Crown owed no fiduciary duties with regard to the implementation of the
relevant sections of the Manitoba Act, 1870, it was “not concerned with an action for breach of
fiduciary duty.” 112 If it had been, McLachlin CJ and Karakatsanis J, relying on Wewaykum and
Lameman, reiterated that limitation statutes apply to Indigenous claims for breach of fiduciary
obligations where the administration of Indigenous property is concerned. 113 So is it only in the
context of challenges to the constitutionality of legislation or of Crown action that statutes of
limitations and laches do not apply? How would Indigenous people have known before Guerin
that the Crown has fiduciary obligations and can be liable for their breach? Apparently, though,
the Court is reluctant to allow old claims to proceed that could cost the Crown, and thus
Canadian taxpayers, a lot of money. 114 The Court acknowledged that where Indigenous claims
are involved, the usual policy considerations for limitation periods need to give way sometimes
to other considerations, especially the need for reconciliation. 115 Surely this goal should weigh in
the balance for claims that involve potential payment of compensation as well as in constitutional
challenges.
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31 Hastings LJ 1215, esp 1248-49; Kent McNeil, “How the New Deal Became a Raw Deal for Indian Nations:
Justice Stanley Reed and the Tee-Hit-Ton Decision on Indian Title” (2019) 44:1 Am Indian L Rev 1, especially at
11-13.
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periods and laches, thereby acknowledging that time limits on Tribunal proceedings would not promote
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Having examined the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the application of limitation periods and
laches, we can now analyze some of the fundamental constitutional, policy, and justice issues in
more depth.
3. Constitutional Issues
As Justice Binnie’s judgment in Wewaykum demonstrates, application of the doctrine of laches to
equitable claims is driven by the facts, especially evidence of the conduct of the parties. If the
plaintiff knowingly acquiesced in the status quo for a long time and the defendant was led to
believe that no legal action would be brought, it would be unjust to allow the plaintiff to stir up
dead coals. However, while application of the equitable doctrine of laches, including the use of
limitation periods by analogy, is always discretionary, application of statues of limitations, if
pleaded, is not. 116 But to apply legislation, judges first have to interpret it, and this does give
them a fair amount of leeway.
(a) Statutory Interpretation and Colonial Authority
In fulfilling this interpretive role, the courts are guided to some extent by presumptions and
conventions. 117 One such presumption is against statutory taking or limitation of rights. While
legislatures have the authority to infringe or extinguish rights that are not constitutionally
protected, the intention to do so must be clear and plain. 118 This presumption is a judicially
created protection for legal rights. 119 It applies to legislation, such as statutes of limitations, that
restricts access to the courts. 120
116

See note 24-25 and accompanying text above. However, courts may have inherent jurisdiction to extend
limitation periods in the interests of justice: see Ordon Estate v Grail, 30 OR (3d) 643 (Ont CA) at paras 119-20,
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Appeal relied upon Basarsky v Quinlan, [1972] SCR 380, in which the Court exercised its discretion to grant leave
to amend a statement of claim, even though the application to amend came after the expiration of the relevant
limitation period. However, if the action is in the Federal Court, apparently discretion to extend limitation periods is
absent, as that court’s jurisdiction is statutory rather than inherent: see Tacan, supra note 58 at paras 86-88; Jim Shot
Both Sides, supra note 60 at paras 225-29. Also, see Athabasca Chipewyan, supra note 84 at para 3, suggesting that
there is no discretion to extend the limitation period for judicial review in Alberta. In most jurisdictions, statutes of
limitations must be pleaded to be relied upon (this can depend on applicable Rules of Court): see Beardsley v
Ontario (2011) 57 OR (3d) 1 at paras 21-22; Collins v Cortez, 2014 ONCA 685 at para 10; Williams, supra note 24
at 18-19.
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Pierre-André Côté, Stéphane Beaulac, & Mathieu Devinat, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed
(Toronto: Carswell, 2011); Oliver Jones & FAR Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation: A Code, 6th ed
(London: LexisNexis, 2013).
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See Spooner Oils Ltd. v Turner Valley Gas Conservation Board, [1933] SCR 629 at 638; Attorney-General for
Canada v Hallet & Carey Ltd., [1952] AC 427 (PC), especially at 450; Leiriao v Val-Bélair (Town), [1991] 3 SCR
349 at 356-57 (L’Heureux-Dubé J, dissenting on other issues); Colet v R, [1981] 1 SCR 2 at 10; Crystalline
Investments Ltd. v Domgroup Ltd, [2004] 1 SCR 60 at para 43; Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of
Statutes, 6th ed (Markham ON: LexisNexis, 2014), §15.37-15.49.
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See TRS Allan, "Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism" (1985) 44
Cambridge LJ 111.
120
Statutes of limitation are interpreted strictly in favour of plaintiffs: Ordon Estate SCC, supra note 116 at paras
135-39, citing Berardinelli v Ontario Housing Corp., [1979] 1 SCR 275 at 280, per Estey J: “[A limitations
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terms, attracts a strict interpretation and any ambiguity found upon the application of the proper principles of
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In Indigenous contexts, another rule of statutory interpretation operates to protect the rights of
Indigenous peoples from statutory interference as much as possible. In Nowegijick v The Queen,
Justice Dickson, as he then was, stated:
… treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful
expressions resolved in favour of the Indians…. In Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1
(1899), it was held that Indian treaties “must ... be construed, not according to the
technical meaning of [their] words ... but in the sense in which they would naturally
be understood by the Indians”. 121
Commenting on this passage in Mitchell v Peguis Indian Band, Chief Justice Dickson said:
The Nowegijick principles must be understood in the context of this Court’s
sensitivity to the historical and continuing status of aboriginal peoples in Canadian
society…. It is Canadian society at large which bears the historical burden of the
current situation of native peoples and, as a result, the liberal interpretive approach
applies to any statute relating to Indians, even if the relationship thereby affected is a
private one. Underlying Nowegijick is an appreciation of societal responsibility and a
concern with remedying disadvantage, if only in the somewhat marginal context of
treaty and statutory interpretation. 122
This rule has since been consistently affirmed and applied by the Supreme Court. 123 In R v
Badger, Justice Cory added:
…the honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealing with Indian people.
Interpretations of treaties and statutory provisions which have an impact upon treaty
or aboriginal rights must be approached in a manner which maintains the integrity of
the Crown. It is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises. 124
In Restoule v Canada (Attorney General), 125 the Nowegijick principles of statutory interpretation
were applied to a statute of limitations that the Crown argued barred a treaty right claim. Justice
Hennessy decided that the Ontario limitations statute in question did not contain provisions
barring action for violation of treaty rights. 126
statutory interpretation should be resolved in favour of the person whose right of action is being truncated.” See also
Sullivan, supra note 118 at §15.41, and other cases cited there, especially Ukrainian (Fort William) Credit Union
Ltd. v Nesbitt, Burns Ltd (1997) 36 OR (3d) 311 (CA); Des Champs v Conseil des écoles séparées catholiques de
langue française de Prescott-Russell, [1999] 3 SCR 281, especially para 18.
121
[1983] 1 SCR 29 at 36.
122
Mitchell v Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 SCR 85 at 99 [Peguis]. See also per La Forest J at 142-43.
123
E.g. see Simon, supra note 39 at para 27; R v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025 at 1035 [Sioui]; R v Horseman, [1990] 1
SCR 901 at 906-08 (Wilson J, dissenting on other grounds), 930 (Cory J); Sparrow, supra note 91 at 1107-08; Van
der Peet, supra note 1 at paras 24, 143, 188.
124
[1996] 1 SCR 771 at para 41.
125
2020 ONSC 3932 (CanLII) at paras 202-38 [Restoule ONSC].
126
Ibid at paras 198-200. The Ontario CA, affirming the non-application of the limitations statute as a matter of
statutory interpretation, decided that, as Justice Hennessy’s comments on the relevance of the Nowegijick principles
were obiter, those principles did not have to be considered in disposing of the appeal: Restoule v Canada (Attorney
General), 2021 ONCA 779 (CanLII) at paras 635-39 [Restoule ONCA].
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The English statutes of limitations that were received at various times in Canada obviously could
not have been intended to apply to Indigenous peoples when enacted. More importantly, these
statutes were received only to the extent they were applicable to local circumstances. 127
Relations between the Indigenous nations and the Crown were governed by unique constitutional
documents such as the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and by treaties. 128 The circumstances of
those relations and the sui generis rights of the Indigenous peoples acknowledged by those
documents should have been convincing reasons for not applying statutes of limitations to
Indigenous claims. For example, it would have been inconsistent with the Royal Proclamation,
which protected Indigenous lands that had not been purchased by the Crown from grant by
governors or acquisition by settlers, for limitations statutes to apply to Indigenous claims. As
Justice La Forest acknowledged in Peguis, “at least since the signing of the Royal Proclamation
in 1763…, the Crown has always acknowledged that it is honour-bound to shield Indians from
any efforts by non-natives to dispossess Indians of the property which they hold qua Indians, i.e.,
their land base and their chattels on that land base.” 129
Moreover, we have seen that, since Crown assertion of sovereignty in Canada, the honour of the
Crown has been a fundamental constitutional principle guiding relations with the Indigenous
peoples. 130 Statutory limitation or extinguishment of Indigenous peoples’ legal rights would not
have been consistent with the honour of the Crown, given that the Crown was honour-bound to
protect those rights. Accordingly, application of English statutes of limitations in Indigenous
contexts should have been excluded by these considerations.
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See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-69), I,
107, relied upon in Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas 286 (PC) at 291-92. For Canadian case law, see Ziff, “Warm
Reception”, supra note 26.
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See Chippewas of Sarnia Band v Canada (Attorney General), 2000 CanLII 16991 (ON CA), 51 OR (3d) 641 at
paras 48-60 [Chippewas of Sarnia CA], leave to appeal refused, [2001] 4 CNLR iv; Canada, Report of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol 1, Looking Forward, Looking Back (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1996), 111-32 [RCAP]; James [sa’ke’j] Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the Constitution
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Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples (D Phil Thesis, Oxford University, 1979), online: https://
works.bepress.com/brian_slattery/24, “The Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Aboriginal Constitution” in Terry
Fenge & Jim Aldridge, eds., Keeping Promises: The Royal Proclamation of 1763, Aboriginal Rights, and Treaties in
Canada (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 14, online:
https://works.bepress.com/brian_slattery/99/, and “Aboriginal Title and the Royal Proclamation of 1763: Origins
and Illusions” (December 2019)
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gins_and_Illusions; Jack Stagg, Anglo-American Relations in North America to 1763 and an Analysis of the Royal
Proclamation of 7 October 1763 (Ottawa: Research Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1981).
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Similarly, it is unlikely that colonial and provincial statutes of limitations were intended to apply
to Indigenous claims. 131 Prior to Confederation, relations with Indigenous peoples were
generally regarded as an Imperial concern to be handled by London rather than local
governments. 132 Even if intended to apply to Indigenous claims, colonial statutes could only
have done so if the legislature in question had been delegated authority to legislate in relation to
Indigenous peoples. In the Chippewas of Sarnia case, Justice Campbell concluded that “the
colonial legislatures that enacted [pre-Confederation limitations] statutes had no power to affect
or extinguish either aboriginal or treaty rights as these were matters exclusively within the
Imperial authority and beyond the colonial legislative power at the time.” 133 The Ontario Court
of Appeal affirmed most of his judgment for other reasons, so did not address this issue
explicitly. 134
(b) Division-of-powers Issues
(i) Interjurisdictional Immunity
Since Confederation, “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” have been within the
exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 135 As a
result, provincial statutes singling Indigenous people out for special treatment would be
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See Chippewas of Sarnia CA, supra note 128 at paras 236-42, concluding that pre-Confederation statutes of
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Otis, “La revendication d’un titre ancestral sur le domaine privé au Québec” (2021) 62:1 Cahiers de Droit 277 at
291 n60.
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318-22 [McNeil, “Extinguishment”]; Robert Hamilton, “After Tsilhqot’in Nation: The Aboriginal Title Question in
Canada’s Maritime Provinces” (2016) 67 UNBLJ 58 at 84-92, 98-104; Calder, supra note 3 at 406-13 (Hall J,
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authority insofar as Aboriginal title was concerned).
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128 at note 4 after para 312, this happened when “the imperial government approved provincial legislation
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invalid. 136 However, provincial laws of general application can apply to Indigenous people, even
if the proportional impact on them is greater than on non-Indigenous people. 137
Provincial statutes of limitations are undoubtedly laws of general application. It therefore must
be asked whether they can apply of their own force to limit Indigenous peoples’ access to the
courts to resolve their claims. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation v
British Columbia,138 the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity prevented provincial laws of
general application from applying if they would impair the core of federal jurisdiction under
section 91(24), even in the absence of federal law occupying the field. 139 Until that decision in
2014, this core encompassed section 35 Aboriginal and treaty rights, 140 but it was broader than
that – it included exclusive jurisdiction over any matters relating to the status or capacity of
Indigenous peoples, as well as over possession and use of section 91(24) lands. 141 To the extent
that provincial statutes of limitations would impair Indigenous status or capacity, they would
have trenched upon the core of Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands
reserved for the Indians”, and so would have to be read down to prevent that result. 142
To what extent, then, did the Tsilhqot’in Nation case alter the law in this regard? In a unanimous
judgment, Chief Justice McLachlin held that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity no
longer protects Aboriginal and treaty rights from provincial infringement. She reasoned that
these rights are now adequately protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 143 In its
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recent decision in R v Desautel, 144 the Supreme Court appeared willing to acknowledge that
there may be common law Aboriginal rights that are not section 35 rights as defined in Van der
Peet 145 and other cases. This possibility is consistent with the doctrine of continuity, by which
rights under a previous legal regime continue after Crown acquisition of sovereignty, 146 as
acknowledged by McLachlin CJ in Mitchell 147 and by the majority in Desautel. 148 If common
law Aboriginal rights outside the scope of section 35 are within the core of section 91(24)
jurisdiction, as they should be insofar as they involve Indigenous status or capacity, then they
should still be protected against provincial infringement by interjurisdictional immunity.
Moreover, if interjurisdictional immunity protection for Aboriginal and treaty rights was made
unnecessary by section 35, as the Court suggested, 149 then the division-of-powers protection
those rights enjoyed up to the enactment of that provision should not have been affected. 150
Before April 17, 1982, provincial statutes of limitations that impinged on the Aboriginal and
treaty rights within the core of federal section 91(24) would have had to be read down to avoid
that effect. 151 This follows from Chief Justice Lamer’s decision in Delgamuukw. 152 When the
Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation relied on section 35 to remove constitutionally-recognized
Aboriginal and treaty right from the protection of interjurisdictional immunity, surely the it did
not intend to reverse the earlier case law relied upon by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw. 153 Moreover,
in R v Morris the Supreme Court had held that treaty rights are within section 91(24)’s core and
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thus protected by interjurisdictional immunity against provincial infringement. 154 In Tsilhqot’in
Nation, Chief Justice McLachlin said, in obiter, 155 that, to “the extent that Morris stands for the
proposition that provincial governments are categorically barred from regulating the exercise of
Aboriginal rights, it should no longer be followed.” 156 The words we have italicized indicate a
prospective direction for courts to abide by in the future, not a retroactive overruling of a
previous decision, which would require more than obiter remarks in a case involving different
rights and different facts. 157
In conclusion, prior to the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision, the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity should have prevented provincial statutes of limitations from applying of their own
force to bar claims based on section 35 Aboriginal and treaty rights. 158 Regardless of that
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decision, claims involving Indigenous status or capacity that do not involve section 35 rights
should still be protected by interjurisdictional immunity against application of their own force of
provincial limitations statutes.
(ii) Provincial Powers and Extinguishment
Interjurisdictional Immunity is not the only division-of-powers argument against provincial
limitations statutes applying of their own force. In addition, given section 91(24), ever since
Confederation provincial legislatures have lacked constitutional authority to extinguish
Aboriginal and treaty rights. They cannot do it directly because they cannot enact laws in relation
to Indigenous people, especially if the legislation would impact them negatively. 159 But they
cannot do it indirectly either by enacting laws of general application, such as statutes of
limitations. 160 In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer explained why:
[A] law of general application cannot, by definition, meet the standard which has
been set by this Court for the extinguishment of aboriginal rights without being ultra
vires the province. That standard was laid down in Sparrow, supra, at p. 1099, as one
of “clear and plain” intent. In that decision, the Court drew a distinction between
laws which extinguished aboriginal rights, and those which merely regulated
them. Although the latter types of laws may have been “necessarily inconsistent”
with the continued exercise of aboriginal rights, they could not extinguish those
rights. While the requirement of clear and plain intent does not, perhaps, require that
the Crown “use language which refers expressly to its extinguishment of aboriginal
rights” (Gladstone, supra, at para. 34), the standard is still quite high. My concern is
that the only laws with the sufficiently clear and plain intention to extinguish
aboriginal rights would be laws in relation to Indians and Indian lands. As a result, a
provincial law could never, proprio vigore, extinguish aboriginal rights, because the
intention to do so would take the law outside provincial jurisdiction. 161
The question, then, is whether statutes of limitations that bar Indigenous claims in court
extinguish the claimed rights. 162 Behind this question is a debate over whether statutes of
immunity was also rejected in the context of claims of trespass to and conversion of oil and gas located on reserve
lands.
159
See cases cited supra in note 136.
160
See Otis, supra note 131 at 290-91; Townshend, supra note 150 at 481-82. For affirmation of the rule that
governments cannot do indirectly what they are prohibited from doing directly, see Madden v Nelson and Fort
Sheppard Ry, [1899] AC 626 at 627-28; Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General), 1948
CanLII 317 (UK JCPC), [1949] 2 DLR 145 at 150; McKay v The Queen, [1965] SCR 798 at 806.
161
Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para 180, citing Sparrow, supra note 91, and R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723. See
also Chippewas of Sarnia SCJ, supra note 9 at paras 571-75, for application of the “clear and plain” requirement to
treaty rights, affirmed Chippewas of Sarnia CA, supra note 128 at paras 226-29, 236-41.
162
Limitations statutes that do this expressly have been held to be inapplicable to Indigenous lands. Regarding
reserve lands, which like Aboriginal title lands are within Parliament’s exclusive section 91(24) jurisdiction, see
Canadian Pacific, supra note 59 at 673, citing with approval The Queen v Smith, [1981] 1 FC 346 (see especially
paras 94-110), overturned on other grounds, [1983] 1 SCR 554. In Chippewas of Sarnia SCJ, supra note 9 at paras
476-81, Campbell J relied on these cases in deciding that provincial statutes of limitations could not apply to
Indigenous lands reserved by treaty. The Court of Appeal affirmed his decision on this issue: Chippewas of Sarnia
CA, supra note 128 at para 24, noting as well at para 222 that this aspect of his decision had not been appealed. See
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limitations are procedural or substantive, that is, do they just bar access to the courts or do they
extinguish rights. Sometimes the statute in question makes this clear, 163 but often it does not.
In this context, distinctions need to be made between real property, choses in possession
(chattels) and choses in action, and between in rem and in personam actions. Land and chattels
can be possessed, so if the statute does not expressly extinguish the right, a claimant can in some
situations get the land or chattel back by reacquiring possession, even after the time for bringing
an action has run out. 164 Choses in action, such as debts, cannot be possessed, as they do not
exist physically, and so can only be recovered by legal action. So if legal action is statute barred,
the right must be extinguished, as there is usually no possible way to recover or enforce it. 165
also Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 9 at para 1314, where Vickers J held, consistently with Delgamuukw,
supra note 1 at paras 177-80, that provincial limitations statutes could not extinguish Aboriginal title.
163
E.g. see the Ontario Real Property Limitations Act, supra note 71, s 15: “At the determination of the period
limited by this Act to any person for making an entry or distress or bringing any action, the right and title of such
person to the land or rent, for the recovery whereof such entry, distress or action, respectively, might have been
made or brought within such period, is extinguished.” This provision dates from an 1834 Upper Canada statute, An
Act to Amend the Law Respecting Real Property, 4 Will IV, c 1, s 37 (UC): see Chippewas of Sarnia SCJ, supra
note 9 at paras 448-53, 527-28. The Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266, contains an equivalent provision regarding
personal actions and rights: “9(1) On the expiration of a limitation period set by this Act for a cause of action to
recover any debt, damages or other money, or for an accounting in respect of any matter, the right and title of the
person formerly having the cause of action and of a person claiming through the person in respect of that matter is,
as against the person against whom the cause of action formerly lay and as against the person’s successors,
extinguished.” Although that Act was repealed and replaced by the Limitation Act, SBC 2012, c 13, the application
of the former Act was preserved in part by section 2 of the latter Act, which provides: “2(2) This Act does not apply
to court proceedings based on existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada that are
recognized and affirmed in the Constitution Act, 1982. (3) Court proceedings referred to in subsection (2) are
governed by the law that would have been in force with respect to limitation of actions if this Act had not been
passed.” In other words, insofar as Aboriginal and treaty rights are concerned, the former statute, including section
9(1), still applies in British Columbia, subject to constitutional restrictions. In Restoule ONSC, supra note 125 at
paras 219-20, Justice Hennessy expressed the opinion that, due to equivalent provisions in the Limitations Act, 2002,
SO 2002, c 24, Sch B, s 2(1) (e) and (f) and s 2(2), the replaced statute was no longer a statute of general
application. It relates to “Indians” and so attracted the Nowegijick principles of statutory interpretation (see text at
notes 121-26 above), though even without the 2002 statute she considered the earlier statute would bear upon treaty
promises and so attract the Nowegijick principles. While finding it unnecessary to deal with the Nowegijick
principles (see supra note 126), the Ontario CA noted: “The legislature chose not to reference Aboriginal treaties in
the 1990 Limitations Act, although it did so in the 2002 Limitations Act. This is strongly suggestive of an intention
not to impose a limitation period for claims based on a breach of an Aboriginal treaty.” Restoule ONCA, supra note
126 at para 662, Hourigan JA for the Court (see para 91) on the limitations issue.
164
See Miller v Dell, [1891] 1 QB 468 at 471, and discussion in Eileen E Gillese, Property Law: Cases, Text and
Materials, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1990), 3:38-39. Compare the Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266, s
9(2) (replaced by the Limitation Act, SBC 2012, c 13, s 27), The Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM, c L150, s 54(2),
and the Limitation of Actions Act, SNB 2009, c L-8.5, s 9(2), by which title to chattels is explicitly extinguished at
the end of the limitation period.
165
An apparent exception is equitable set-off in an action to enforce a debt or other obligation. According to the
Ontario Court of Appeal, a defendant can rely on a right that has been barred by statutory limitation as a defence,
but not as a counterclaim, to an action in debt: see Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v Pierce, 2005 CanLII 15706 (ON
CA) at paras 37-46, leave to appeal refused, [2005] SCCA No 336; Grand Financial Management Inc v Solemio
Transportation Inc, 2016 ONCA 175, 395 DLR (4th) 529, at paras 92-94, leave to appeal refused, [2016] SCCA No
183, 2016 CanLII 58416 (SCC). See also Eli Lilly and Company v Apotex Inc, 2009 FC 991 (CanLII) at para 631;
Chevron Canada Resources v Canada, 2019 ABQB 418 (CanLII) at paras 173-76; Harvest Operations Corp v
Obsidian Energy Ltd, 2020 ABQB 563 (CanLII) at para 68. Compare Karkut v Highway Traffic Board, 1969 CanLII
599 (SK QB) at para 10. The explanation for the exception is that, in exercising their equitable jurisdiction, courts
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Similarly, constitutional contexts aside, 166 in rem actions are usually designed to recover
possession of physical property, and in that sense are rights against the world, whereas in
personam actions are actions against persons (e.g. actions in tort or contract) for recovery of
damages. Barring an in rem action would not necessarily bar the right to the thing, whereas
barring an in personam action would effectively extinguish the right. In this context, the maxim,
“where there is a right, there is a remedy,” can be flipped around and expressed negatively:
where there is no remedy, there is no right. Or, as respected jurist Herbert Broom put it, “it is a
vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy, for want of right and want of remedy are
reciprocal.” 167
Apart from the Manitoba Metis Federation case, the Supreme Court cases discussed above all
involved claims to damages, so they were all in personam actions, albeit against the Crown, an
abstract corporation sole. 168 In each instance, the barring of actions for breach of fiduciary
obligations meant the Indigenous claimants were left with no remedy. To conclude that their
rights still existed, but were merely unenforceable, would be artificial, or “vain”, as Broom put it.
The reality is that their rights were statutorily extinguished in each of those cases. 169
And yet, in Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation 170 Justice Smith of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s
Bench, in an action arising out of flooding caused by construction of hydroelectric dams on the
Churchill River between 1928 and 1943, expressed the opinion that the Saskatchewan statute of
limitations that he applied in the case is procedural rather than substantive. 171 The case involved

will not allow limitation periods to bar defences, even though they bar claims and counterclaims. However, these
decisions relied on English authority. In England, statutes of limitation are regarded as procedural rather than as
substantive and so, in the absence of clear language to the contrary, they bar actions but not rights: see Tolofson v
Jensen, [1994] 3 SCR 1022 at para 80 [Tolofson]. Query whether the apparently obiter remarks regarding equitable
set-offs by the Ontario Court of Appeal are consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Tolofson (not cited in
the set-off cases) that, in Canada, statutes of limitation are substantive: see below at notes 173-80. However, given
that the Supreme Court refused leave in these Ontario cases, it may be better to regard equitable set-offs as an
exception designed to balance the interests of the parties and achieve justice.
166
See below at notes 234-41.
167
Herbert Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims, 8th American ed (Philadelphia: T & JW Johnson, 1882), 191, citing
Ashby v White (1703) 2 Lord Raym 938, 92 ER 126; Winsmore v Greenbank (1745) Willes 577, 125 ER 1330.
168
See FW Maitland, “The Crown as Corporation Sole” (1901) 17 LQR 131.
169
In Wewaykum, supra note 23 at para 115, Binnie J said that the BC statute of limitations “provides for
extinguishment of the cause of action”, but extinguishment of the cause of action must entail extinguishment of the
right in situations where there is no other way to enforce it.
170
Peter Ballantyne QB, supra note 93, commented on by Luk & Barrett, supra note 4 at 410-12, 417. See also
Michel v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SKQB 334 (CanLII), where the Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation’s claim for
continuing trespass by flooding of their reserve land (the Saskatchewan CA in Peter Ballantyne CA, supra note 63
at paras 94-148, 265, decided this claim had not been barred by limitations) was also dismissed on the ground that
the lands in question were not reserve lands.
171
Affirming on appeal (except regarding the trespass action: see note 170 above), Peter Ballantyne CA, supra note
63, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal (at para 186) referred to this obiter opinion, without expressing either
agreement or disagreement. The Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal, Chief Ronald Michel et al v
Attorney General of Canada et al, 2017 CanLII 38581. See also Stoney Nakota Nations QB, supra note 158 at paras
67-70, where Jeffrey J referred to the uncertainty in the law on this issue without trying to resolve it. Instead, he
relied on Blueberry River, supra note 44, Lameman, supra note 78, Wewaykum, supra note 23, and Manitoba Metis
Federation SCC, supra note 80, to conclude that “the law is clear that claims for personal remedies brought by First
Nations, such as the Trespass Related claims, are subject to time limitations legislation” (para 72). His judgment was
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claims for declarations and damages for breach of honour of the Crown, breach of the Crown’s
fiduciary obligations, and trespass to reserve lands. Relying on Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
decisions that did not involve Indigenous claims, 172 Smith J stated that in damage
… claims of this nature the limitation periods are procedural in that they merely act
to bar the remedy sought, rather than extinguish the underlying right.
This conclusion is also consistent with cases like Lameman wherein the plaintiff
claimed recovery due to breach of treaty rights but was barred by statute. This case
makes clear that just because a limitation period effectively bars an Aboriginal group
from a remedy it does not mean that the legislation infringes the right from which the
claim may have arisen. The legislation merely limits the time in which the claim can
be brought. 173
With all due respect, the Lameman decision did not decide that barring remedies does not
infringe Indigenous rights. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that statutes of limitations are
substantive because they make rights unenforceable. In Tolofson v Jensen, 174 the Court decided
that a provision of a Saskatchewan statute limiting the time in which an action arising out of a
vehicle accident could be brought is substantive. The decision was based in part on the fact the
case involved conflict of laws, but the Court was clearly uncomfortable with the traditional
English law position that statutes of limitations that do not explicitly extinguish rights are
procedural. Justice La Forest, delivering the principal judgment, referred to “the rather mystical
view that a common law cause of action gave the plaintiff a right that endured forever. A statute
of limitation merely removed the remedy in the courts of the jurisdiction that had enacted the
statute.” 175 He contrasted this with the civil law position in continental Europe, where
… all statutes of limitation destroy substantive rights.
I must confess to finding this continental approach persuasive. The reasons that
formed the basis of the old common law rule seem to me to be out of place in the
modern context….
… So far as the technical distinction between right and remedy [is concerned],
Canadian courts have been chipping away at it for some time on the basis of relevant
policy considerations. I think this Court should continue the trend. It seems to be
particularly appropriate to do so in the conflict of laws field…. 176

affirmed on appeal without discussion of the procedural/substantive issue: Stoney Tribal Council v Canadian Pacific
Railway, 2017 ABCA 432 (CanLII) at paras 18, 98 (Stoney Tribal Council CA).
172
Ravndahl v Saskatchewan, [2007] 10 WWR 606; Johnson v Johnson (2012) 399 Sask R 196.
173
Peter Ballantyne QB, supra note 93 at paras 146-47; see also paras 126-27. Smith J’s conclusion that limitations
statutes do not infringe rights was applied in Stoney Nakota Nations QB, supra note 158 at para 98, affirmed on
appeal, Stoney Tribal Council CA, supra note 171. For agreement that limitation statutes bar remedies without
extinguishing rights, see Samson First Nation, supra note 54 at para 129; Jim Shot Both Sides, supra note 60 at para
221. Compare Restoule ONSC, supra note 125 at para 221 (application of the limitations statute would “entirely
abrogate” the Crown’s treaty promises); see also para 231.
174
Tolofson, supra note 165 at paras 74-90.
175
Ibid at para 80.
176
Ibid at paras 81-82, 85.
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Thus, although the decision in Tolofson on this issue was made in the context of conflict of
laws, 177 the Court was clearly of the opinion that limitation statutes are substantive in general
and not just for that purpose. 178 If these statutes were substantive for some purposes and
procedural for others, as Smith J seems to have thought, this would be illogical and create
confusion in the law. More importantly, to cling to the notion that rights continue in some
“mystical” form even though they are unenforceable is unrealistic. It would mean one could
remove “in action” from “chose in action” and retain the chose (thing), which is absurd because
the chose has no independent existence. 179 Similarly, when in personam rights become
unenforceable, the rights themselves are meaningless and so cease to exist. 180
In conclusion, contrary to the views of Justice Smith in Peter Ballantyne QB, 181 provincial
limitations statutes that bar Indigenous peoples from any action or remedy to enforce their rights
effectively extinguish those rights and so should not apply of their own force to Indigenous
claims. 182
(iii) Referential Incorporation of Provincial Statutes of Limitations
Even though, for division-of-powers reasons, provincial limitations statutes should not apply of
their own force to extinguish Indigenous rights or, prior to the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision in
2014, to infringe section 35 rights (due to section 91(24) and the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity), we have seen that these statutes can apply as federal law if referentially incorporated
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In Peter Ballantyne QB, supra note 93 at paras 139-46, Smith J, relying on Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
decisions, distinguished Tolofson on this basis.
178
See Castillo v Castillo, [2005] 3 SCR 870 at para 7 [Castillo]. At para 37, Bastarache J, concurring on this issue,
stated: “The effects of limitation periods were made clear in Tolofson: they cancel the substantive rights of plaintiffs
to bring the suit, and they vest a right in defendants to be free from suit.” See also Michalski v Olson, 1997 CanLII
2360 (MB CA), 123 Man R (2d) 101 at para 23: “the determination in the Tolofson case that limitation laws are
substantive, rather than procedural, cannot have come as a surprise. To say that a limitation provision is procedural
because it bars a remedy rather than extinguishing a right is an exercise of semantic gymnastics that would baffle
any rational observer outside the legal profession.”
179
In Markevich v Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94 [Markevich], an action for collection of tax (a chose in action) that the
Court held had been barred by a limitations statute, Major J, in his majority judgment at para 41, stated: “Limitation
periods have traditionally been understood to bar a creditor’s remedy but not his or her right to the underlying
debt. In my view, this is a distinction without a difference. For all intents and purposes, the respondent’s federal tax
debt is extinguished.”
180
This may be why statutes of limitation that explicitly extinguish in rem real property rights usually do not bother
to extinguish in personam rights, as the latter can have no meaningful existence if unenforceable in court.
181
It is remarkable as well that neither Smith J nor the Court of Appeal, in deciding that time began to run from
1939 or 1942 at the latest (see Peter Ballantyne QB, supra note 93 at para 149; Peter Ballantyne CA, supra note 63
at para 93), took account of the fact that section 141 of the Indian Act, supra note 41, effectively prevented First
Nations from hiring lawyers to pursue their claims until that section was repealed in 1951. See Luk & Barrett, supra
note 4 at 397-98, 417-20, pointing out as well how the Department of Indian Affairs’ control over band funds and
the power of Indian agents would have impeded the ability of First Nations to take their claims to court.
182
This was the conclusion Campbell J reached in relation to a limitations provision barring remedies without
barring title in Chippewas of Sarnia SCJ, supra note 9 at paras 457-64. At para 462, he stated: “To bar the remedy of
possession is to make hollow the secured right of ownership…. Without a remedy against the owners, the aboriginal
land title means nothing and the treaty guarantee has no value. Aboriginal title cannot exist as a right in the air
without a remedy for its vindication on the ground.” His decision on limitations issues was affirmed on appeal,
Chippewas of Sarnia CA, supra note 128 at paras 220-42, leave to appeal refused by the SCC.
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by Parliament, as held in Blueberry River and Wewaykum. 183 Prior to the enactment of section 35
in 1982, federal laws that were clear and plain enough, including laws referentially incorporated,
could extinguish Indigenous rights. 184 However, post-section 35, even Parliament has been
unable to extinguish the rights that are constitutionally protected by that section. 185
Even if some limitations provisions only infringe Aboriginal or treaty rights, for the infringement
to be constitutionally allowable after the enactment of section 35 it would have to be justified by
the Crown in accordance with the Sparrow test. 186 This test requires proof of a valid legislative
objective and respect for the Crown’s fiduciary obligations by showing minimal impairment of
the rights, consultation with the rights-holders, and payment of compensation when appropriate.
While limitations statutes would probably have a valid legislative objective, it is extremely
doubtful that the Crown could meet the other requirements for justifiable infringement. 187
Moreover, payment of compensation might cost the Crown as much as settling the claim it
sought to have barred by the statute.
In addition to the provisions in the Federal Court Act 188 and the Crown Liability and
Proceedings Act, 189 section 88 of the Indian Act, 190 added in 1951, 191 referentially incorporates,
with certain exceptions, 192 provincial laws of general application that would not apply to
“Indians” of their own force. 193 However, if, as we have concluded, provincial limitations
statutes extinguish rights (where rights in relation to land are concerned, most do so expressly),
they would not be referentially incorporated into federal law by section 88 because, as decided
by Chief Justice Lamer in Delgamuukw, “s. 88 does not evince the requisite clear and plain intent
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See supra notes 52-53, 56-60, 65 and accompanying text.
See R v Sikyea, 1964 CanLII 510 (NWT CA), affirmed [1964] SCR 642; The Queen v George, [1966] SCR
267; R v Derriksan (1976) 71 DLR (3d) 159 (SCC); Sparrow, supra note 91 at 1091-99. But see Chippewas of
Sarnia SCJ, supra note 9 at paras 566-70, relying on Sioui, supra note 123 at 1063, to cast doubt on Parliament’s
power to extinguish treaty rights, even prior to 1982. Compare Chippewas of Sarnia CA, supra note 128 at para 238.
185
Van der Peet, supra note 1 at para 28; Mitchell, supra note 90 at para 11.
186
Sparrow, supra note 91 at 1111-19
187
Cases in which the Crown has succeeded in justifying an infringement are rare. We are aware of this example
involving prohibition of use of live bait for fishing: Constant c Québec (Procureur général), 2003 CanLII 47824
(QC CA), [2003] 2 CNLR 240, leave to appeal refused, [2003] SCCA No 110.
188
Supra note 36.
189
Supra note 79. See text following note 86, supra.
190
Supra note 89.
191
Then, section 87: SC 1951, c 29.
192
The incorporation of provincial laws is subject “to the terms of any treaty and any other Act the Parliament” and
excludes laws that are “inconsistent with this Act or the First Nations Fiscal Management Act, or with any order,
rule, regulation or law of a band made under those Acts, and except to the extent that those provincial laws make
provision for any matter for which provision is made by or under those Acts” (the First Nations Fiscal Management
Act, SC 2005, c 9, exception would, of course, apply only after that statute was enacted). For application of the
treaty exception, see R v White and Bob, 1964 CanLII 452 (BC CA), affirmed 1965 CanLII 643 (SCC); Simon,
supra note 39; Sioui, supra note 123; Morris, supra note 140.
193
Kruger, supra note 137; Dick, supra note 139 at paras 37-45. The term “Indians” is defined in sections 2(1) and
6-7 of the Act. Inuit and Métis are excluded, so section 88 does not apply to them. See Kent McNeil, “The Métis and
the Doctrine of Interjurisdictional Immunity: A Commentary” in Frederica Wilson & Melanie Mallet, eds, MétisCrown Relations: Rights, Identity, Jurisdiction, and Governance (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008), 289-322.
184
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to extinguish aboriginal rights.” 194 Also, according Justice Lysyk in Chief Stanley Thomas, 195
section 88 only referentially incorporates provincial laws that would trench upon federal
jurisdiction over “Indians”, not laws that would interfere with federal jurisdiction over “Lands
reserved for the Indians.” 196 If this is correct, 197 then even if provincial limitations statutes would
only infringe rather than extinguish Indigenous rights, they could not apply by way of section 88
to claims relating to reserves, Aboriginal title lands, or other “Indian” lands. 198 Moreover, though
non-extinguishing statutes relating to other claims might apply by way of section 88, 199 to the
extent that those statutes infringe section 35 Aboriginal or treaty rights after enactment of that
section, they would have to be justified under the Sparrow test.
It is nonetheless worth repeating that, despite decisions such as Peter Ballantyne, it is unrealistic
and inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions 200 to treat limitations statutes as though they do
not extinguish rights without doing so explicitly. This is particularly so where choses in action
and in personam rights are concerned. Where in rem rights to land are concerned,
extinguishment is usually explicit. 201 If the statute in question extinguishes the right in question,
either expressly or by necessary implication, it cannot apply to Aboriginal and treaty rights,
either of its own force or by referential incorporation into federal law, after the enactment of
section 35.
(c) Constitutional and Personal Remedies
Recall that in Manitoba Metis Federation the Supreme Court held that actions challenging the
constitutionality of legislation or Crown action (or inaction) cannot be barred by limitation
statutes. However, the Court suggested that, while a declaration of invalidity or breach of the
honour of the Crown is available in this context, statutes of limitations can still bar damage
remedies, even those arising out of the same unconstitutional legislation or dishonourable Crown
194

Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para 183. See also Chippewas of Sarnia SCJ, supra note 9 at paras 489-90;
Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC, supra note 138 at paras 1318-29. For discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and
Section 88 of the Indian Act” (2000) 34 UBC L Rev 159: Kerry Wilkins, “Still Crazy After All These Years: Section
88 of the Indian Act at Fifty” (2000) 38:2 Alta L Rev 458.
195
Supra note 41 at paras 27-40.
196
The same conclusion was reached in Chippewas of Sarnia SCJ, supra note 9 at paras 491-95, and Tsilhqot’in
Nation BCSC, supra note 9 at paras 1033-40.
197
The issue was discussed but left open in Derrickson, supra note 139 at paras 51-59.
198
An example of other Indian lands to which provincial laws do not apply can be found in Sechelt Indian Band,
supra note 153.
199
See Kruger, supra note 137; Dick, supra note 139. However, given the Supreme Court’s obiter direction in
Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC, supra note 138, that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity no longer applies to
section 35 rights, referential incorporation by way of section 88 may not be necessary for provincial infringement
post-2014 to be justifiable.
200
Tolofson, supra note 165; Castillo, supra note 178; Markevich, supra note 179.
201
E.g. see the Real Property Limitation Act, RSO 1990, c L15, s 15; Limitation of Actions Act, RSA 1980, c L-15, s
44, replaced by the Limitations Act, RSA 2000, c L-12; The Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM, c L150, s 53; Real
Property Limitations Act, RSNB 1973, c R-1.5, s 60; Limitation of Actions Act, SNB 2009, c L-8.5, s 8.1(6); Real
Property Limitations Act, RSNS 1989, c 258, s 22; The Limitation of Actions Act, RSS 1978, c L-15, s 46, replaced
by The Limitations Act, SS 2004, c L-16.1. Note that the fact some of these statutes have been repealed and replaced
does not mean they are of no further effect. Where a limitation statute is relied upon, it is typically the one in force
when the cause of action arose, which is not necessarily the one when legal proceedings were commenced: see
Wewaykum, supra note 24 at paras 125-29; Peter Ballantyne CA, supra note 63 at para 179.
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conduct. The Court relied on two of its previous decisions, Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v New
Brunswick (Finance) 202 and Ravndahl v Saskatchewan. 203
The Kingstreet Investment case involved a claim by taxpayers for restitution of taxes paid under
a provincial statute held to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court decided that the provincial
statute of limitations applied, limiting repayment to the six-year limitation period. The Court
dealt with the limitations issue in three short paragraphs, with scant explanation of why damage
claims arising out of unconstitutional legislation should be subject to limitation statutes. Justice
Bastarache, for the Court, stated simply that “[t]here is no reason why modern restitutionary
claims ought not to be subject to s. 9”, 204 the relevant provision of the New
Brunswick Limitation of Actions Act. 205 He relied on and affirmed Justice Robertson’s Court of
Appeal decision on this point, justified in part by the need for governments to be able to avoid
fiscal chaos by placing time limits on claims for restitution of unconstitutional taxes. 206
Ravndahl involved a claim for reinstatement of the plaintiff’s widow’s pension she had been
receiving after her husband’s death in 1975. When she remarried in 1984, her pension was
terminated pursuant to a provision of the Saskatchewan workers’ compensation legislation. To
support her claim for restoration of the pension and damages, she sought a declaration that the
provision revoking her pension was unconstitutional because it violated her right to equality
provided by section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 207 In a unanimous
decision delivered by Chief Justice McLachlin, the Supreme Court decided that the provincial
statute of limitations applied, barring the claim to damages and reinstatement of her pension
because her action had been commenced more than six years after section 15 came into force on
April 17, 1985, which the Court found to be the time when her cause of action arose. 208 The
plaintiff’s claim for a declaration of constitutional invalidity, on the other hand, would not be
barred because such a claim is not subject to limitations statutes. The case was sent to trial “to
determine whether a declaration of invalidity should be granted, and if so, what remedies if any
should be granted. Because the appellant’s personal claims are statute-barred, any remedies
flowing from s. 52 [of the Constitution Act, 1982] would not be personal remedies, but would be
remedies from which the appellant, as an affected person, might benefit.” 209
The Court noted that “[i]t is important to distinguish the appellant’s personal, or in
personam, remedies, brought by her as an individual, from an in rem remedy flowing from s.
202

Kingstreet Investments SCC, supra note 100.
Ravndahl SCC, supra note 100. See Roach, supra note 100 at §11.250-261; Mew, supra note 30 at §18.49-54.
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Kingstreet Investments SCC, supra note 100 at para 60.
205
RSNB 1973, c L-8.
206
Kingstreet Investments Ltd. and 501638 N.B. Ltd v The Province of New Brunswick as represented by the
Department of Finance and New Brunswick Liquor Corporation, 2005 NBCA 56 (CanLII) at paras 39-42. See also
Air Canada, supra note 114. However, in Kingstreet Investments SCC, supra note 100 at paras 28-29, Bastarache J
agreed with Wilson J (dissenting in part) in Air Canada at 1215 that fiscal considerations should not be used to
justify placing the burden of an unconstitutional tax on individual taxpayers rather than on taxpayers as a whole.
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Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 [Charter], supra note 31.
208
The Court “assume[d], without deciding, that a challenge to a pre-Charter denial of benefits would be a
permissible application of the Charter”: Ravndahl SCC, supra note 100 at para 18.
209
Ibid at para 26. Section 52(1) provides: “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law
that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or
effect.”
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52 that may extend a benefit to the appellant and all similarly affected persons.” 210 The Court
explained that “[p]ersonal claims for constitutional relief are claims brought as an
individual qua individual for a personal remedy” 211 and, following Kingstreet Investments, held
that these claims are subject to limitations statutes.212 Ravndahl thus extended the application of
this holding from division-of-powers invalidity to invalidity under section 15 of the Charter,
despite section 24(1). 213 It is surprising that the Court would do so without analysis, given that
section 24(1) is supposed to provide courts with broad discretion to craft constitutional remedies
that is not explicit in division-of-powers contexts and that should not be subject to override by
legislation. 214
In her motion judgment in Ravndahl, Queen’s Bench Justice Pritchard acknowledged the
conflicting opinions in relation to personal remedies in court of appeal judgments. 215 In Prete v
Ontario (Attorney-General), 216 the plaintiff, who had been acquitted of a murder charge, brought
an action for malicious prosecution, alleging that his section 7 Charter “right to life, liberty and
security of the person” had been violated. He claimed damages as a remedy under section 24(1)
of the Charter. The Crown brought a motion to dismiss, based in part on the expiry of the sixmonth limitation period in the Public Authorities Protection Act. 217 The Ontario Court of Appeal
decided that the statutory limitation could not apply to a section 24(1) remedy. Carthy JA
explained: “The purpose of the Charter, in so far as it controls excesses by governments, is not at
all served by permitting those same governments to decide when they would like to be free of
those controls and put their houses in order without further threat of complaint.” 218 He added that
“[t]he historic purposes of limitation periods are best served, when Charter remedies are sought,
by the court refusing relief on the basis of laches in appropriate cases.” 219A laches approach
would, at least, give judges discretion in applying time limitations to personal remedies for
Charter violations so the justice of individual cases could be taken into account. Where
limitations statutes are concerned, equivalent discretion does not exist, though superior courts
may have inherent jurisdiction to extend limitation periods in the interests of justice. 220
Prete can be compared with Nagy v Phillips 221 and St-Onge v Canada. 222 In Nagy, the plaintiff
claimed damages for violation of her section 8 Charter right “to be secure against unreasonable
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search and seizure”, arising out body searches conducted at Edmonton International Airport and
a local hospital. In her unanimous judgment, Justice Hetherington simply stated: “The
respondent’s claim under the Charter is … a claim for damages in respect of injuries arising out
of a breach of a duty to refrain from breaching the Charter. That duty must arise from
the Charter. Such a claim is clearly covered by s. 52 of the Limitations of Actions Act.” 223 No
further explanation was provided and neither Prete nor section 24(1) was mentioned in the
Alberta Court of Appeal’s judgment.
St-Onge involved a claim against the Crown arising out of actions by employees at the Canada
Employment Centre in Timmins, Ontario, that the plaintiff alleged violated his sections 15 and
20 Charter rights. 224 On a motion to dismiss, Justice Hugessen stated:
In my view, there is absolutely no doubt that an action in tort based on delicts which
are at the same time infringements of rights guaranteed by the Charter is subject to
the prescription generally applicable to any action of a delictual nature. The Charter
was adopted in a context which already included two well-developed systems of civil
law with sophisticated rules of procedure and the appropriate courts to give effect to
them. The Charter contains no purely procedural provisions and no rule governing
prescription….
[E]xisting legislation and procedures continued to apply except where they were
clearly inconsistent with the Charter itself. A prescription deadline which generally
applies to all actions of the same nature and does not in any way discriminate against
certain groups of litigants does not in any way contravene the Charter. 225
Hugessen J’s judgment was affirmed on appeal. Justice Noël, for the Federal Court of Appeal,
stated that the relevant section of the Ontario statute of limitations “is an enactment of general
application that applies to any civil liability action, irrespective of whether it is based on a
violation of Charter rights.” 226 Prete was apparently distinguished because it involved “the
constitutional validity of short limitation periods when they preclude the exercise of a Charter
right.” 227
More recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal itself distinguished Prete in Alexis v Darnley, 228 an
action for unlawful detainment in violation of the plaintiff’s Charter rights. Justice Rouleau, for
the Court, observed:
The Prete decision does contain language that could be read as suggesting that the
question of whether a s. 24(1) claim is time-barred should be governed by the
doctrine of laches and not by statutory limitation periods: para. 13. However, read in
context, these comments express the court’s preference for the laches approach over
the limitation period set out in the Public Authorities Protection Act. They do not
223
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support the far broader proposition that s. 24(1) claims, brought by an individual and
seeking personal remedies, cannot be subject to any statutory limitation period. 229
He went on to point out that courts of appeal in other jurisdictions had not interpreted Prete as
deciding that limitations statutes generally do not apply to section 24(1) remedies. 230 They
distinguished Prete because the limitation period there was short and benefited only the Crown.
Relying also on Ravndahl, 231 Rouleau JA rejected “the appellant’s submission that the Prete
decision renders any statutory limitation period inapplicable to Charter claims brought as an
individual for personal remedies.” 232
Although limitations statutes of general application are available to any defendants in appropriate
circumstances (unlike the Public Authorities Protection Act at issue in Prete which sheltered
only public employees), section 24(1) remedies are generally only available against the Crown or
government officials. The focus should therefore be on the scope of section 24(1), not the scope
of the limitations statute. Surely Charter remedies are entitled to a different level of judicial
respect than common law remedies that are subject to statutes of limitations. One would expect
more probing interpretation and in-depth analysis of section 24(1) in the context of these statutes
than has taken place in the cases we have examined. 233
We have seen that the Supreme Court in Kingstreet and Ravndahl distinguished between in
personam remedies under section 24(1) and in rem remedies under section 52(1) and applied this
distinction in Manitoba Metis Federation. 234 But recall that, in Kingstreet and Ravndahl, section
24(1) remedies were sought by individuals (two corporations in Kingstreet and one woman in
Ravndahl), a fact relied upon in the latter case, and that section 24(1) does not apply to violations
of Indigenous rights. 235 The Manitoba Metis Federation case was brought by 17 individual Métis
persons and a corporate body (the Federation) on behalf of the approximately 100,000 to 130,000
Métis of the province. 236 So to rely on Kingstreet and Ravndahl to maintain that “claims for
personal remedies flowing from the striking down of an unconstitutional statute are barred by the
running of a limitation period,” as the Court did, 237 does not take into account the sui generis,
229
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collective nature of Indigenous rights. 238 As Chief Justice stated in Delgamuukw, which like
Manitoba Metis Federation also involved land rights, “Aboriginal title cannot be held by
individual aboriginal persons; it is a collective right to land held by all members of an aboriginal
nation.” 239 In the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Newfoundland and Labrador (Attorney
General) v Uashaunnuat (Innu of Uashat and Mani-Utenam), the majority held that, because
Aboriginal rights are sui generis collective rights, it is inappropriate to classify them as either or
personal (in personam) or real (in rem). 240 The distinction between these kinds of rights therefore
should not be used to deny Indigenous claimants remedies in addition to declarations under
section 52(1). Both the unique nature of Indigenous rights generally and the specific rights in
question in any given case should be taken into account. 241
The Court’s comments in Manitoba Metis Federation on the applicability of limitations statutes
to fiduciary obligations relied on cases where constitutional issues either did not apply
(Wewaykum, which did not concern section 35 rights and where the provincial statute of
limitations applied as federal law) or were not raised (Lameman). Moreover, the comments were
obiter because the plaintiffs were asking only for declarations of breach of constitutional duties
by the Crown and constitutional invalidity of legislation under section 52(1); they were not
seeking damages and other remedies. 242 Despite these qualifications, the Manitoba Metis
Federation decision has been applied by lower courts as if it had settled the constitutional issues
around the application of statutes of limitation to Indigenous claims. 243 As argued above, these
administration of Aboriginal property: Wewaykum, at para. 121, and Canada (Attorney General) v Lameman, [2008]
1 SCR 372 at para 13. However, at this point we are not concerned with an action for breach of fiduciary duty, but
with a claim for a declaration that the Crown did not act honourably in implementing the constitutional obligation in
s. 31 of the Manitoba Act. Limitations acts cannot bar claims of this nature.”
238
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issues have not been addressed sufficiently in any of the Supreme Court cases we have discussed
for them to be considered as settled.
4. Third Party Rights
Up until now, virtually all the case law we have examined has involved reliance on statutes of
limitations and laches by the Crown. 244 However, a potentially larger issue involves the
availability of these defences to private persons. 245 It would require a paper at least as long as
this one to treat this topic adequately, 246 so all we can attempt is an overview of the main issues,
starting with the division-of-powers issue discussed earlier. 247
We have seen that provincial statutes of limitation cannot apply of their own force to extinguish
Indigenous rights that come within the ambit of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
This has been true ever since Confederation, for division-of-powers reasons. 248 Arguably,
limitations statutes could not even infringe these rights prior to the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision in
2014. 249 However, before enactment of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Parliament
could not only infringe, but could also extinguish, any Indigenous rights, as long as it did so
clearly and plainly. 250 This could be done by referentially incorporating provincial limitations
constitutionality of limitations legislation on Indigenous and treaty claims.” As the Ontario CA’s decision that the
Ontario limitations legislation does not apply to treaty claims was based solely on statutory interpretation (Restoule
ONCA, supra note 126 at paras 632-62), the constitutional application of limitations statutes to Aboriginal and
treaty claims was not considered on appeal either.
244
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statutes into federal law. So section 88 of the Indian Act, for example, could make provincial
limitations statutes apply so as to infringe some rights of “Indians” (though probably not rights to
“Lands reserved for the Indians”), 251 even though that section is not sufficiently clear and plain
to effect the extinguishment of these rights. 252 If section 88 cannot result in extinguishment of
these rights, even though it relates expressly to “Indians”, surely more general federal
enactments referentially incorporating provincial limitations periods that do not refer to
“Indians” or other Indigenous peoples, such as section 39(1) of the Federal Court Act 253 and
section 32 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 254 would not be sufficiently clear to do
so either.
Since enactment of section 35 in 1982, even Parliament cannot extinguish Aboriginal or treaty
rights, 255 so thereafter provincial statutes of limitations cannot be referentially incorporated by
federal legislation if the effect would be to extinguish section 35 rights. 256 If they infringe
Aboriginal or treaty rights, the infringement has to be justified post-1982 under the Sparrow test.
As discussed above, it is not obvious that this test could be met in this context. 257
We now need to apply this law on the applicability of limitations statutes to third party rights. In
the interests of space, we will limit this discussion to rights relating to land, the context in which
the issue usually arises. 258 Adverse possession aside, private non-Indigenous land rights in
Canada originate from Crown grants. In areas subject to historical land cession treaties
(generally, Ontario and the Prairie Provinces), 259 the Crown acted as though it had acquired the
land by treaty and then granted fee simple estates and other interests. 260 In non-treaty areas such
251
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as most of British Columbia and the Atlantic Provinces, 261 the Crown simply assumed it owned
the land and was able to grant it. In those parts of the country, pre-Confederation colonial
governments would have been unable to issue valid grants of Indigenous lands, both because the
requisite authority probably would not have been delegated to them 262 and because they would
have been prohibited from doing so by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 263
Post-Confederation provincial grants in non-treaty areas could not have extinguished the land
rights of Indigenous peoples either, for two reasons. First, we have seen that, due to section
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, provincial governments do not have the constitutional
authority to extinguish Indigenous rights. 264 Secondly, the provinces would be prevented from
doing so by a fundamental common law rule, expressed by the Latin maxim nemo dat quod non
habet (one cannot give what one does not have). 265 This rule applies to the Crown just like
everyone else. 266
The case law on private persons’ reliance on limitations statutes to bar Indigenous court actions
is meagre, in part because Indigenous peoples usually do not include land held by private persons
in their claims. 267 An exception is Chippewas of Sarnia, decided by the Ontario Superior Court
261
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of Justice in 1999 and affirmed, with some variation, by the Court of Appeal in 2000. 268 In 1827,
the Chippewas entered into a treaty with the Crown, by which they reserved certain Aboriginal
title lands in their traditional territory. In 1839, three of their chiefs sold part of one reserve (the
land under dispute) to Malcolm Cameron, a private speculator, businessman and politician,
without a surrender of the land to the Crown. The motions judge, Justice Campbell, held that the
sale was null and void because it violated the prohibition on private purchases of Indian lands in
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the common law; the Court of Appeal agreed that the sale
was invalid, relying more on Crown practice and the common law inalienability of Aboriginal
title than on the Proclamation. 269
In 1853, the Crown issued a patent granting the disputed lands to Cameron, who sold them to
settlers. At the time of the legal proceedings, the lands, now located in the City of Sarnia, were
occupied by more than 2000 individuals and corporations who were the successors in title of
Cameron. The motions judge held that the “Cameron patent, because it was unauthorized and
because it contravened the surrender requirements of the Royal Proclamation was, from the day
it was issued, void ab initio and of no force or effect.” 270 This put the private land holdings in
jeopardy. Justice |Campbell’s solution was to apply the equitable bona fide purchaser for value
without notice rule, combined with a 60-year equitable limitation period, to bar the Chippewas’
claims to the lands themselves as of 1921, leaving the possibility of damage claims against the
Crown open. 271
The Court of Appeal justices, in a decision by the Court, upheld Justice Campbell’s decision, but
disagreed with aspects of it. Importantly, they decided that the Cameron patent was valid until
set aside by a court and that judges have discretion to set aside Crown grants, irrespective of the
nemo dat rule. 272 Given the interests of the current innocent landholders and the fact that the
provincial limitations statute could bar a claim for damages (which weren’t claimed); however, constitutional issues
were not addressed in the limitations context. Note that the action against the corporate defendant in Uashaunnuat
was terminated by agreement on 3 December 2020: see online:
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Chippewas had acquiesced in the status quo for so long, the Court decided that it would be
inequitable to invalidate the patent and dispossess the private landholders. The appeal judges
agreed with the motions judge that the bona fide purchaser for value without notice rule applied
but disagreed with him on the application of a 60-year equitable limitation period. 273
For present purposes, our main interest in the Chippewas of Sarnia case involves the judicial
treatment of the limitations and laches defences. A number of limitations statutes were pleaded
to block the claim. 274 Justice Campbell held that neither the pre-Confederation nor the postConfederation statutes could apply to extinguish Aboriginal title. 275 The pre-1867 statutes did
not display the necessary clear and plain intent 276 and post-1867 Ontario statutes could not apply
of their own force because provincial legislatures do not have the constitutional authority to
extinguish Aboriginal title. 277 Referential incorporation of the Ontario statutes into federal law
by section 88 of the Indian Act could not do that either because, once again, the requisite clear
and plain intent to extinguish was lacking, and because section 88 only makes provincial laws of
general application apply to “Indians”, not Indian lands. 278 Campbell J decided as well that
section 39 of the Federal Court Act 279 did not apply because the action had not been brought in
the Federal Court. 280 The federal Crown Proceedings and Liability Act 281 did not either as it only
applies to actions by or against the Crown in right of Canada, and even though the federal Crown
was a defendant it was not relying on limitation periods. 282 For this reason, the private occupiers
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could not rely on it, and, in any case, the Court found that it does not exhibit a clear and plain
intent to extinguish Aboriginal title. 283
The Court of Appeal affirmed Justice Campbell’s decision on the non-applicability of limitations
provisions. 284 Importantly, the Court accepted that the pre-Confederation statutes did not display
the requisite clear and plain intent to extinguish Indigenous land rights, that the province did not
have the constitutional capacity to extinguish those rights by means of limitations statutes, 285 and
that incorporation of provincial statutes into federal law did not make them applicable to legal
actions in provincial courts against private occupiers. 286
As a result of the Chippewas of Sarnia case, the private occupiers were unable to rely on any
statutory limitation periods because the action had been commenced in a provincial superior
court and provincial limitations statutes did not apply either of their own force or by referential
incorporation into federal law. Thus, even if the statutes displayed the necessary clear and plain
intent to extinguish the Chippewas’ land rights (which they did not), they could not do so. Justice
Campbell and the Court of Appeal were therefore faced with a situation where they had to decide
between the Chippewas’ unextinguished land rights and the interests of the innocent private
occupiers. The judges relied on equity to come down on the side of the occupiers.
Justice Campbell rejected the application of the equitable doctrines of laches and acquiescence,
as the factual foundation for these defences was entirely lacking. He observed: “There is no
evidence of the essential elements of neglect and knowledge. There is no evidence that
the Chippewas were aware of their legal rights and in any event they had no means to enforce
them because they lacked the legal capacity to do so until 1951.” 287
The Court of Appeal disagreed with Justice Campbell on the application of laches and
acquiescence by emphasizing different facts: “The Chippewas accepted the transfer of their lands
and acquiesced in the Cameron transaction. The landowners altered their position by investing in
and improving the lands in reasonable reliance on the Chippewas’ acquiescence in the status quo.
This is a situation that would be unjust to disturb.” 288 The Court concluded:
[T]he Chippewas had knowledge of the facts necessary to assert a claim, and in view
of that knowledge, Guerin is distinguishable…. [W]e are of the view that the
Chippewas not only knew that the lands had been given up but actively acquiesced in
the transfer by seeking and receiving payment of the proceeds. On these facts, we can
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see no reason why the equitable defences of laches and acquiescence should not
apply. 289
As the application of the doctrines of laches and acquiescence is discretionary, the outcome
depends very much on individual judges’ views of the facts and the interests of justice, as
Chippewas of Sarnia demonstrates. However, one must also ask whether it is even appropriate to
apply equitable defences to common law actions, which the Chippewas’ claims for possession of
lands and for damages for trespass clearly were. 290 The Supreme Court considered the
application of the defence of laches in Guerin and Wewaykum – applying it on the facts in the
latter case but not in the former – but those cases both involved equitable claims based on
breaches of fiduciary obligations. 291 In Manitoba Metis Federation, Chief Justice McLachlin and
Justice Karakatsanis rejected the application of laches on the facts, and then added:
It is difficult to see how a court, in its role as guardian of the Constitution, could
apply an equitable doctrine to defeat a claim for a declaration that a provision of the
Constitution has not been fulfilled as required by the honour of the Crown. We note
that, in Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327, at
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p. 357, Lamer C.J. noted that the doctrine of laches does not apply to a constitutional
division of powers question. 292
Given that the Chippewas’ land rights at issue in Chippewas of Sarnia were also constitutional,
the laches doctrine should not have been available to the defendants. 293
If, as both Justice Campbell and the Court of Appeal concluded, limitations statutes do not apply
to claims of Indigenous land rights against private occupiers, and, as we have argued, the
equitable doctrines of laches and the bona fide purchaser rule should not apply either, 294 courts
are faced with the uncomfortable possibility that Indigenous claimants will prevail against
innocent parties that have been in peaceful possession of land for long periods of time. 295 As
Chippewas of Sarnia reveals, judges are very reluctant to come to this conclusion. Their solution
in that case was to leave the private occupiers undisturbed, while leaving open claims by the
Chippewas to compensation against the Crown for breach of its fiduciary obligations, claims that
are not barred by limitation periods in Ontario. 296
The Chippewas had suggested alternative solutions. They did “not seek the wholesale eviction of
the present occupiers of the property”; instead, they sought “declaratory relief recognizing their
right to the disputed lands and damages for trespass and breach of fiduciary duty” and were
“ready and willing to negotiate with the federal and provincial governments.” 297 The Court of
Appeal was concerned nonetheless that, if they obtained “the declaratory relief claimed, they
would be entitled to possession of the land.” 298 To avoid this result, the Court exercised its
discretion and refused the declaratory relief. The danger inherent in this approach was pointed
out by the House of Lords in Scott v Scott, where Lord Shaw observed: “To remit the
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maintenance of constitutional right to the region of judicial discretion is to shift the foundations
of freedom from the rock to the sand.” 299
Other authors have suggested ways in which the rights of Indigenous peoples and private
occupiers of unceded Indigenous lands can be balanced to achieve a measure of reconciliation. 300
Brian Slattery, for example, distinguishes between historical and generative Aboriginal title. 301
Historical title is the original title Indigenous peoples have under their own laws and by virtue of
their occupation of lands and territories prior to European colonization, as acknowledged in court
decisions and by the Crown in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and treaties. A generative right is
a modern “right that exists in a dynamic but latent form, which is capable of partial articulation
by the courts but whose full implementation requires agreement between the Indigenous party
and the Crown.” 302 Slattery explains as follows:
Considered as an historical right, aboriginal title is governed by Principles of
Recognition, which are traditional common law rules based on ancient dealings
between the British Crown and Indigenous American peoples. Considered as a
generative right, aboriginal title is governed by Principles of Reconciliation, which
are emergent common law rules that envisage treaty settlements negotiated with the
assistance of the courts. 303
Courts can acknowledge core elements of a generative right sufficient to promote negotiations
and protect the right in the meantime, but full articulation of the right must come from
negotiations rather than judicial decisions. Slattery lists several options available to the courts:
(1) recognize the historical title of the claimant group as it existed at the time of
Crown sovereignty, as a baseline for modern negotiations;
(2) issue such orders as are necessary and appropriate to protect the historical title
from further erosion and invasion, while taking account of existing private and public
interests;
(3) recognize the right of the claimant group to use and possess certain portions of its
historical territory, either immediately or after the lapse of a specified period of time;
299

[1913] AC 417 (HL) at 477, where his Lordship went on to state: “The right of the citizen and the working of the
Constitution in the sense which I have described have upon the whole since the fall of the Stuart dynasty received
from the judiciary – and they appear to me still to demand of it – a constant and most watchful respect. There is no
greater danger of usurpation than that which proceeds little by little, under cover of rules of procedure, and at the
instance of judges themselves.” The Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Chippewas at issue in Chippewas of Sarnia
are constitutional rights, protected by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867,
and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
300
In summarizing selected works by these authors, we are unable do justice to the sophistication of their arguments.
Readers are encouraged to read the works themselves. See also McNeil, “Reconciliation”, supra note 246 (arguing
that, where lands subject to Aboriginal title cannot be returned without dispossessing innocent third parties,
compensation should be paid by governments who are the real wrongdoers); Hamilton, “Role of Equity”, supra note
246 (arguing that conflicts between Indigenous land rights and private property interests should be resolved through
negotiations with the goal of achieving coexistence and reconciliation, rather than through questionable application
of equitable doctrines and judicial discretion, as happened in Chippewas of Sarnia).
301
Slattery, “Metamorphosis”, supra note 246.
302
Ibid at 262.
303
Ibid at 257. Slattery elaborates further on these principles at 281-86.

47

(4) enjoin the parties to enter into negotiations aimed at defining the modern scope of
aboriginal title, as a generative right. 304
He goes on to suggest that a “court should be flexible and creative in fashioning orders designed
to achieve these ends, in keeping with its mandate to recognize and affirm aboriginal rights, both
at common law and under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.” 305 Regrettably, it was just
this kind of flexibility that was lacking in the decisions in the Chippewas of Sarnia case.
Gordon Christie has less confidence in the ability of Canadian courts to avoid the colonial
paradigm permeating much of the case law. 306 He thinks that, if the matter is left to the courts,
they will give preference to private property rights, as happened in Chippewas of Sarnia. While
he perceives a glimmer of hope in the Supreme Court’s recognition of pre-existing Indigenous
sovereignty in Haida Nation 307 and of the need to reconcile this pre-existing sovereignty with de
facto Crown sovereignty, 308 he does not see this reconciliation as a job for the courts. Instead, it
should involve a dialogue, “primarily between the Crown and each Indigenous nation in relation
to its traditional territories, though perhaps with some room for the voices of private property
owners.” 309 How might an Indigenous nation understand what it views as illegitimate acts by the
federal and provincial governments, including the grant of fee simple interests to settlers?
Engaging in what he calls “a thought-experiment”, 310 Christie speculates that, at the time when
settlers began to encroach on their lands, Indigenous nations may have
… imagined that while each society or nation would manage its own internal affairs,
together they would work out a way of sharing the physical space they would come
to co-inhabit, an arrangement that would preserve key elements of group autonomy
while allowing for a process whereby important decisions about shared land use were
arrived at between the two societies. 311
This policy of sharing, based on respect and trust, might help provide a way to overcome the past
colonial actions of non-Indigenous governments. Dialogue might lead a conception of “shared
radical title”, 312 based on “truly inter-societal understandings”, leading to sub-arrangements such
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as “agreements on limits to expropriation, powers of taxation, resource co-management, and so
forth.” 313 Christie acknowledges that
Private property would be affected … but there is no need to imagine that it would be
seriously threatened. Recognizing that Aboriginal title runs parallel to Crown title
does not push aside such things as fee simple title, for all such legal entities exist on
top of deeper forms of radical title. 314
He concludes that “creative dialogue could conceivably lead to just and sensible arrangements
wherein Aboriginal title might peacefully coexist with third party private property interests.” 315
John Borrows points out that interests in land, whether Indigenous or private, are not absolute;
even Crown title is often constrained by other interests, including Indigenous rights. 316 Focusing
on Crown grants of unceded Indigenous lands, he argues that the “bluntness” of the application
of the nemo dat rule 317 might be attenuated by “Indigenous law, future treaties and Canada’s
broader constitutional framework.” 318 He elaborates as follows:
Indigenous peoples’ own laws can accommodate a wide variety of interests. If
private owners have accrued entitlements under Indigenous law through their long
presence on Indigenous lands it could be possible to continue to protect these
interests. Even though the Crown wrongfully created these interests they may
nevertheless be sustained under the jurisdiction of an Indigenous legal system. As
discussed, the Constitution can give force to these interests as it regards Indigenous
peoples’ own laws as part of Canada’s constitutional structure. Furthermore the
Crown could recognize this result through treaties, which would likewise secure
constitutional protection for private ownership within Indigenous legal systems. 319
Borrows’ approach is in keeping with the generosity Indigenous peoples have always shown to
non-Indigenous Canadians and their willingness to share and respect private property rights in
most instances. This does not mean non-Indigenous interests should always take precedence. In
Borrows’ words,
Reconciliation should not always force the Aboriginal interest to “give-way”.
Sometimes it is the Crown or private interests which must be modified or eliminated
in advancing this goal…. The Courts should strive to protect each interest, as
vigorously as possible, with priority being afforded to Aboriginal title because of its
constitutional undergirding, particularly when compared to the non-constitutional
aspects of private ownership. 320
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Borrows concludes that “private property should not be automatically immune from a declaration
of Aboriginal title.” 321 He hopes that this may be an incentive for the negotiation of modern
treaties on a leveller playing field than has previously existed. The principles to be applied in
resolving potential conflicts between Indigenous and private parties are “fairness,
proportionality, reasonableness, fundamental justice and reconciliation.” 322
It is not our intention to choose between these various approaches or to articulate an alternative
approach. What we want to emphasize is that creative solutions, usually proposing dialogue and
negotiation rather than court action, are available to address the potential conflict between
Indigenous land rights and private property. Reconciliation cannot involve favouring private
property completely over Indigenous rights, as happened in Chippewas of Sarnia, nor can it
involve, in Brian Slattery’s words, deciding that “historical aboriginal title gives rise to modern
rights that automatically trump third party and public interests”, as that would constitute “an
attempt to remedy one grave injustice by committing another.” 323 Use of limitations statutes and
the doctrine of laches to give priority to private interests would not lead to a fair balancing of
rights and reconciliation either – instead, in Slattery’s words, it would “rub salt into open
wounds.” 324
5. Conclusions
In Wewaykum, Justice Binnie summarized some of the policy rationales for limitation periods:
“Witnesses are no longer available, historical documents are lost and difficult to contextualize,
and expectations of fair practices change. Evolving standards of conduct and new standards of
liability eventually make it unfair to judge actions of the past by the standards of today.” 325 The
circumstances of Indigenous peoples are different. 326 The wrongs they suffered were often
committed long in the past, before they had any awareness of their rights in the Canadian legal
system. While witnesses may no longer be alive, Indigenous people retain memory of past events
in their oral histories, which the Supreme Court has said are admissible as evidence and have to
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be accorded the same kind of respect and weight as written documents. 327 Unlike private papers,
the historical documents relating to most Indigenous claims are preserved in Canadian
archives. 328 As for the standards of the day, the racism inherent in past government treatment of
Indigenous peoples is good reason not to rely on those standards to bar legal actions today.
The recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Southwind v Canada 329 provides a striking
example of past racist standards. In 1929, a hydroelectric dam authorized by the Canadian,
Ontario and Manitoba governments was built at the outlet of Lac Seul in northwestern Ontario.
The dam caused the level of the lake to rise by 10 feet, flooding 17 percent (11,304 acres) of the
Reserve of the Lac Seul First Nation (LSFN) that had been set aside for their exclusive use and
occupation pursuant to Treaty 3, entered into by Canada and the Anishinaabe in 1873. The
disastrous implications for the LSFN were ignored. The dam was built without their consent,
without lawful authorization, and without compensation (totally inadequate compensation was
paid 14 years later). In the words of Justice Karakatsanis, delivering the majority judgment,
“Homes were destroyed, as were wild rice fields, gardens, haylands, and gravesites. Fishing,
hunting, and trapping were all impacted. The LSFN was separated because one part of the
Reserve became an island. And, despite the sacrifices suffered by the LSFN to make the
hydroelectricity project possible, the Reserve was not provided with electricity until the
1980s.” 330 One concerned government official, HJ Bury, the Supervisor of Indian Timber Lands,
writing years after construction of the dam about the failure to make adequate provision for the
impact of the flooding on the LSFN and to pay compensation, complained:
I desire to again draw your attention to the serious breach of faith that our
Department has made with the Indians of the Lac Seul Reserve, respecting promises
made to them regarding flooding compensation…. I consider that these Indians have
been very shabbily treated. Their Reserve lands, timber, houses, gardens, rice beds,
musk-rat swamps have been flooded now for some years, and we still procrastinate[.]
[I]f it had been a white settlement, no person would have dared to flood the property,
without paying compensation before flooding took place. 331
The treatment of the LSFN was not an isolated incident. 332 Should the Crown be able to escape
liability for this kind of “standards of the day” abuse by hiding behind statutes of limitations? 333
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To allow this to happen would be inconsistent with the Southwind decision, where the Court,
relying on Guerin 334 and subsequent decisions, emphasized that “the Crown is subject to a
fiduciary duty when it exercises control over Indigenous interests. This fiduciary duty imposes
strict obligations on the Crown to advance the best interests of Indigenous Peoples…. The duty
does not melt away when Canada has competing priorities.” 335
In Wewaykum, Justice Binnie emphasized the “need for repose.” 336 This focus has to be
understood in the factual context of that case, where two Indian bands were challenging each
other’s entitlement to their respective reserves. Binnie J commented: “Each band had settled and
legitimate expectations with respect to the reserve it now inhabits. Each band still recognizes the
need for repose of its sister band (thus seeking compensation from the Crown rather than
dispossession of its sister band). Each band claims repose for itself, thus pleading the limitation
period in its own defence against the other band.” 337 The need for repose does not necessarily
apply in other cases. In the incest case of M.(K.) v M.(H.), Justice La Forest stated that “there is
absolutely no corresponding public benefit in protecting individuals who perpetrate incest from
the consequences of their wrongful actions. The patent inequity of allowing these individuals to
go on with their life without liability, while the victim continues to suffer the consequences,
clearly militates against any guarantee of repose.” 338 In Wewaykum, the Supreme Court was
concerned about the repose of the two bands. But why should the Crown be entitled to repose for
the wrongful acts it committed against Indigenous peoples when, like the father who sexually
abused his young daughter in M.(K.) v M.(H.), the Crown is in a fiduciary relationship with
Indigenous peoples? 339
Indigenous peoples have always faced barriers to the access to justice other Canadians take for
granted. They have had to try to understand what for them are foreign common law and civil law
systems and seek redress for the wrongs in courts staffed almost exclusively by non-Indigenous
judges. Until relatively recently, sovereign immunity barred them from seeking justice against
the Crown in Canadian courts without the Crown’s permission. 340 From 1927 to 1951, a
provision of the Indian Act made it illegal for First Nations to raise money or pay lawyers to
pursue their claims without the federal government’s consent. Given the poverty of many
Indigenous communities, lack of financial resources has also presented a barrier to costly legal
proceedings. 341 Limitations statutes and laches are another impediment relied upon by the Crown
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to prevent Indigenous peoples’ legitimate claims from even being adjudicated. In light of all this,
allegations that they have waited too long and “slept on their rights” ring hollow. In M.(K.) v
M.(H.), the Supreme Court decided that “this rationale for a rigorous application of the statute of
limitations is particularly inapposite for incest actions”, 342 as the victims are often not aware of
the connection between the abuse and the damage they have suffered until much later, sometimes
after entering therapy. Although the rationales are not the same, there are equally good reasons
why Indigenous peoples should not be denied access to the courts by the passage of time.
In the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Uashaunnuat, a main reason the majority gave for
deciding that the Superior Court of Quebec has jurisdiction to decide a case involving an
Aboriginal title claim that extends into Labrador is to provide the plaintiffs with access to
justice. 343 Chief Justice Wagner and Justices Abella and Karakatsanis stated: “In the specific
context of s. 35 claims that straddle multiple provinces, access to justice requires that
jurisdictional rules be interpreted flexibly so as not to prevent Aboriginal peoples from asserting
their constitutional rights, including their traditional rights to land.” 344 Likewise, procedural
barriers such as limitations statutes and laches should not bar Indigenous peoples’ access to the
courts to enforce their collective rights.
Another compelling argument against the application of limitation statutes to Indigenous claims
is that these statutes vary considerably from province to province. For example, there is no
limitation period on fiduciary claims in Ontario, whereas there is in other provinces. 345 The
length of time during which claims can be brought also varies from province to province. These
and other statutory differences mean that Indigenous claims that could be brought in one
province would be barred in another. This makes no sense, given that the Supreme Court has
held that Aboriginal rights law is federal law. 346 Moreover, the Court has also rejected an
argument that, due to French colonial law, the Indigenous peoples of Quebec do not have
Aboriginal rights equivalent to the rights of Indigenous peoples elsewhere in Canada. This view,
Chief Justice Lamer asserted,
… would create an awkward patchwork of constitutional protection for aboriginal
rights across the nation, depending upon the historical idiosyncrasies of colonization
over particular regions of the country. In my respectful view, such a static and
retrospective interpretation of s. 35 cannot be reconciled with the noble and
prospective purpose of the constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal and treaty rights
in the Constitution Act, 1982. Indeed, the respondent’s proposed interpretation risks
undermining the very purpose of s. 35(1) by perpetuating the historical injustice
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suffered by aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonizers who failed to respect the
distinctive cultures of pre-existing aboriginal societies. 347
The same reasoning must apply in the context of diverse provincial limitations statutes.
In this paper, we have presented what we regard as compelling constitutional and policy
arguments against the application of limitations statutes and laches to Indigenous claims. 348
Wewaykum, based as it was on unique facts, should not have been relied upon to conclude
generally, as the Supreme Court did in Lameman, that “the rules on limitation periods apply to
Aboriginal claims.” 349 As Lameman was decided without any consideration of the underlying
constitutional issues, the Court’s understanding of the law in that case needs to be reassessed to
take those issues into account. In Manitoba Metis Federation, the Supreme Court did consider
constitutional issues, deciding that limitation periods do not apply to declarations of
constitutional invalidity.350 The Court also acknowledged that “many of the policy rationales
underlying limitations statutes simply do not apply in an Aboriginal context such as this.
Contemporary limitations statutes seek to balance protection of the defendant with fairness to the
plaintiffs…. In the Aboriginal context, reconciliation must weigh heavily in the
balance.” 351 Elaborating, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Karakatsanis stated:
What is at issue is a constitutional grievance going back almost a century and a
half. So long as the issue remains outstanding, the goal of reconciliation and
constitutional harmony, recognized in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and
underlying s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, remains unachieved. The ongoing rift in the
national fabric that s. 31 was adopted to cure remains unremedied. The unfinished
business of reconciliation of the Métis people with Canadian sovereignty is a matter
of national and constitutional import. 352
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, reconciliation is the underlying purpose of section
35. Most recently, in Southwind, Justice Karakatsanis, for eight members of the Court, stated:
347
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In the context of our national history, the relationship between the Crown and
Indigenous Peoples goes to the very foundation of this country and to the heart of its
identity. Indeed, the need to reconcile the assertion of Crown sovereignty with the
pre-existence of Indigenous Peoples, and to reconcile Indigenous and non-Indigenous
Canadians is of “fundamental importance”. 353
Along with access to justice, reconciliation should be the predominant policy to be considered
when limitations statutes and laches are pleaded by the Crown in an attempt to bar Indigenous
claims from even being considered by the courts.
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